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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the economic and political effects of the breakup of East
Prussia into what is today Poland, Russia and Lithuania. We explore the dissolution
of imperial regions into the boundaries of modern states, adding new insights to the
research on the imperial legacies. We expect that German imperial legacies in the
form of advanced economic institutions, and specifically East Prussian legacies of
nationalistic and conservative political preferences, persist in the territories of former
East Prussia in Poland, Russia and Lithuania compared to neighboring regions in
their respective countries. We find no pattern of persistence in former East Prussian
territories of contemporary Poland, whereas East Prussian persistence appears to
be robust in Lithuania. We find strong evidence for the comparative persistence
of political preferences in the Kaliningrad region, whereas we observe no economic
spillovers. Drawing evidence from West German electoral data in the aftermath of
World War II, we find that the presence of East Prussian refugees is conducive to
conservative and nationalist support in the FRG. Hence, the East Prussian legacy
relates primarily to the persistence of political preferences and migrating agents.
Keywords: institutions, political economy, political preferences, migration, East Prussia,
West Germany
JEL Codes: F14, N74, O52, P51
∗Freie Universität Berlin, Institute for East European Studies & School of Business and Economics,
Garystr. 55, 14195 Berlin, Germany, Tel. +49 30 838 72979, maria.polugodina@fu-berlin.de.
†Freie Universität Berlin, Institute for East European Studies & School of Business and Economics,
Garystr. 55, 14195, Berlin, Germany, T: +49-30-838-57037, theocharis.grigoriadis@fu-berlin.de.
1
1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that cultural and institutional factors have a massive impact on
economic behavior and economic development. Economic research on persistence of
cultural traits has gained much momentum in the last few decades, and an important
role is played by the literature on legacies of states long vanished. It includes studies of
the European empires that broke down in World War I, and of the long-lasting impact
of socialism. The case of Poland, in particular, a single state reborn from the ashes of
three empires, is popular in the literature as it shows how cultural traits of the different
empires have persisted for a century, even in a unified political and institutional space.
Our goal is to investigate the question of cultural persistence from a different perspec-
tive, namely, through a lens of state dissolution. If one installs different institutional
environments in a homogenous region, will the similarities across this region persist?
Our regional focus lies in the former German province of East Prussia, which, by the
end of World War II, was partitioned between Lithuania, Poland and Russia (at that
time as a member of the Soviet Union). The region’s location within the modern states
is illustrated in Figure 1. Like borders that vanish de jure but are de facto visible in
socioeconomic data for decades, regions that vanish through such dissolution might
remain visible for quite long. Especially in terms of geographically small regions like
East Prussia, one can ask whether there is a tradeoff between nation-building, which
culminated in the development of nation-states during the twentieth century, and the
preservation of regional ties, both economic and cultural, which have existed for centuries.
In economics, for example, geographic proximity and common history or culture are an
important factor in economic integration (see, e.g., Anderson and Wincoop 2003, and
Wolf et al. 2011). More broadly, there is still the debate in economic geography whether
it is the region or its population that determines the distribution of economic activity.
In line with research on cultural transmission in families and through inter-family
spillovers (see, e.g., Bisin and Verdier 2001), we study cultural persistence in former
East Prussia through the lens of the demographic shock and pre-shock diversity in that
region. Our empirical approach to capture “culture” is to compare political preferences,
as revealed by voting outcomes, and entrepreneurial activity in and around former East
Prussia. Using detailed regional data on modern Lithuania, Poland and Russia, we
first investigate whether the regions of those countries located in former East Prussia
are different from those located outside it. For Lithuania and Poland, we do so using
the regression discontinuity design. In the case of Russia, as the region of Kaliningrad
(formerly Königsberg) is geographically detached from the “mainland”, we employ what
is a novel method in economics: coarsened exact matching, an automated algorithm that
stratifies covariates and offers the degree of post-matching covariate imbalance. Second,
we also test for the similarities between the regions of the three countries in former
East Prussia. Finally, as the region experienced a massive population outflow in the
aftermath of World War II, we also investigate how the migrating East Prussians affected
the political preferences in the regions they moved to.
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Figure 1: East Prussia before World War II and the modern states
Source: Authors’ work. Base map: GADM, HGIS Germany & ESRI Gray
We find differential patterns of East Prussian persistence across the Polish, Lithuanian
and Russian territories of former East Prussia. In Poland, we observe no pattern of East
Prussian persistence, with the former East Prussian territories of Poland exhibiting no
significant difference in entrepreneurship in services that are more reliant on economic
institutions, compared to the areas of Poland on the other side of the border. The
same observation holds for political preferences: nationalism and political conservatism
are lower on the East Prussian side of the internal Polish border. In Lithuania, in
contrast, we observe strong patterns of persistence when we evaluate both political and
economic outcomes. While the political legacy of East Prussia is significantly stronger
than the economic one, we also find that economic institutions, as exhibited through
entrepreneurship types, are stronger on the East Prussian side of the internal Lithuanian
border. For Russia, too, we show that the East Prussian political legacies of nationalism
and conservatism persist in Kaliningrad, whereas there is no evidence of persistence in
relation to economic activity.
Moreover, we find that the massive population movement from East Prussia to other
German regions after its partition between Poland and the Soviet Union in 1945 affected
the voting patterns in the expellees’ host regions in West Germany. In line with the
historical patterns in East Prussia, the regions with higher shares of East Prussian
expellees in total population tend to vote more conservatively and nationalistically.
These findings perfectly illustrate the persistence channel usually postulated, namely
inter-generational transmission of values (such as political preferences) and transmission
of skills and networks (conducive to economic development). We find that the regions
where persistence is “broken” are those that were most ethnically homogenous and where
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an almost complete population exchange took place after World War II. In contrast,
we find evidence for persistence in Lithuania, where the Memel region was annexed as
early as shortly after World War I and the German share of the population gradually
decreased in the next 25 years. Thus the assimilation and gradual departure of the
German population may have secured a better transmission. The absence of persistence
in Poland is also in line with the notion of interrupted transmission and with the literature
on migration, which states that migrating people are different from those staying in
home regions (younger, more entrepreneurial, more liberal-minded). In fact, the voting
patterns we observe today may well be the result of the selection bias of migration.
The findings on West Germany also suggest that East Prussia “moved out”, with its
population taking their preferences with them and voting accordingly in their new homes.
Overall, our findings not only highlight the importance of inter-generational transmission
(“the people”) in socioeconomic development, but also question the extent to which
current studies on persistence implicitly rely on this channel.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we survey the related empirical
literature on the role of culture in economics, border persistence, and the role of refugees
on political polarization and economic development. In Section 3, we provide an overview
of the historical development of East Prussia. In Section 4, we discuss our data and
empirical strategy. Section 5 reports persistence results from the constituent territories
of East Prussia. In Section 6, we discuss the effects of East Prussian migration on West
German political outcomes. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
The role of non-economic forces in economic behavior is gaining growing attention in the
scholarly literature. This link is often set up through institutions and culture that can
influence the determinants of long-term economic growth and hence have long-lasting
impacts. The literature receiving the greatest attention is on domestic institutions
as has been introduced by Acemoglu et al. 2001, Engerman and Sokoloff 1997 or La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997 and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer 2008, who investigate mechanisms through which colonial rule affects current
development and domestic political and economic institutions. In the context of our
current investigation, relevant research refers primarily to the significant persistent impact
of the institutional legacy of the former pre-WWI empires on economic, political and
social development. Schulze and Wolf 2009 find that the political borders that separated
the Habsburg Empire’s successor states after World War I became visible in the economy
as early as from the mid-1880s onwards. They explain this effect of a “border before
a border” by the rise of nationalism along ethno-linguistic lines, controlling for the
role of physical geography, changes in infrastructure, and patterns of integration with
neighboring regions outside of the Habsburg customs and monetary union.
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Yet, despite this socioeconomic disintegration in empires before the war, the legacy of
inter-imperial differences looks substantial. In Eastern and Southern Europe, Dimitrova-
Grajzl 2007 shows that the Habsburg successor states in South-Eastern and Central
Europe have more efficient institutions accommodating their modern market economies
than the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. Grosjean 2011a; Grosjean 2011b
has found negative and persistent effects of Ottoman rule in South-Eastern Europe on
financial development and social norms of trust. Becker et al. 2016 identify a positive
legacy of Habsburg rule on the lack of corruption and on the levels of trust in state
institutions in Eastern European countries. Peisakhin 2015 explores how the division
of a homogenous Ukrainian population between the Austrian and Russian Empires for
almost 150 years has affected political attitudes and behavior in the regions that were
subject to divergent imperial treatments. He surveys individuals in settlements within
15 miles (25 kilometers) of the historical Austrian-Russian border and shows that the
two survey clusters differ in attitudes toward Russia and Europe. He refers to it as a
“cultural legacy of historical institutions”. Lechevalier and Wielgohs 2013 discuss the
effects of the borders between Poland and other countries, but additionally provide a
broader view on border effects using evidence on Abkhazia and Israel. Furthermore,
research on Ukraine (Löwis 2015), Czech Republic (Šimon 2015), Romania (Rammelt
2015) and Serbia (Tomić 2016) provides evidence for differences in social and political
attitudes and for the reappearance of historical borders. Šimon 2015 also points out the
importance of demographic discontinuity, with its negative effect on civic engagement.
His findings on electoral turnout in the Czech Republic are in line with research of
Urbatsch 2017 on effects of ethnic cleansing in Poland. We will show, however, that
demographic discontinuity has more broad effects too.
In the case of Poland, research on the differences between three regions – former par-
titions by neighboring empires – is numerous. Such differences manifest themselves
in physical infrastructure and technology (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Hryniewicz
2003; Zukowski 2004), political behavior and voting patterns (Bartkowski 2003; Grosfeld
and Zhuravskaya 2015; Wysokinska 2015), economic development (Bartkowski 2003;
Wysokinska 2015; Zukowski 2004), interpersonal and institutional trust (Hryniewicz
2003), cultural capital (Lewicka 2005; Zarycki 2015), and social capital (Bukowski 2015;
Lewicka 2005; Zukowski 2004). There is also a lot of research produced on the population
composition of Western and Northern Poland. It deals with the local and regional identity
of populations (e.g. Kozłowski 2003; Eberhardt 2010), social and cultural adaptation
processes of new inhabitants (see the review in Michalak et al. 2011), collective memory
and identity of displaced persons (Giedrojć 2005; Wylgała 2014), integration within
Poland (Sakson 2006; Wolf 2005), and identity after EU accession (Makowski 2008).
Methodologically, recent studies of imperial legacies often rely on spatial regression
discontinuity analysis to estimate discontinuous jumps in social, economic and political
characteristics at the internal border of the former empires (Russia, Germany, Austria-
Hungary) in contemporary states (see, e.g., Bukowski 2015; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya
2015). We use the regression discontinuity design for some of our hypotheses, but also
apply additional methods to handle geographic discontinuities and differences across the
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three countries in our data.
The majority of the literature discussed above focuses on the persistence of borders that
no longer formally exist. The notable exceptions are Becker et al. 2016 and Grosjean
2011a; Grosjean 2011b, who focus on legacies of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires,
respectively, in several modern states in Central and South-Eastern Europe. A further
important example is Beestermöller and Rauch 2014 on trade within the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire. The authors show that the successor states of the Habsburg Empire
still trade more with each other than can be predicted by traditional models and explain
this effect with the persistence of trading capital through cultural memory unrelated to
personal contacts or networks. They identify this channel instead by excluding other
possible transmission channels. Our goal is to focus on the persistence of certain attitudes
in a region dissected by new borders and characterized by quite different demographic
developments after that partition.
Most of the research explicitly or implicitly explains the persistence of border effects
through the persistence of cultural traits. Culture is generally regarded as a fundamental
determinant of economic development. North 2006, p. 4 defines “culture” as “the
accumulated beliefs and inherited institutions from the past that provide the framework
within which we begin thinking about [research] problems”. Tabellini 2010 proposes that
culture is shaped by contemporaneous social interactions as well as the cultural traditions
inherited from earlier generations and finds that the proxies for culture are quantitatively
significant determinants of per capita GDP levels and growth rates across European
regions. An important theoretical contribution in this regard is that of Bisin and Verdier
2001, who show how cultural traits of children are formed by family socialization and
the social environment of their neighborhood. They argue that the socialization efforts
of parents inside the family are higher in more diverse societies, thus leading to stable
equilibria with high cultural heterogeneity. In more homogenous societies, much of
socialization is transferred from the family to the society. An implicit conclusion one
might draw is that, in more diverse societies, cultural persistence can be more resilient
to large-scale demographic shocks as it is less dependent on the social ties outside the
family. Another relevant contribution on preference persistence is that of Alesina and
Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, who study German division and reunification and argue that it
will take one to two generations for East Germans’ preferences to converge toward those
of West Germans completely. This implies that dismantling the differences in preferences
takes about as much time as it does to develop them in the first place.
Specifically when discussing the persistence or transmission of political preferences, we
have to take into account the massive flow of refugees from the eastern regions of Germany
into what was to become the FRG and the GDR (as discussed in the next section).
Here, it is also important to take into consideration the literature on the formation of
political attitudes and the impact of migration. Especially relevant here is the large
body of literature on migration and right-wing party preferences. Increased migration
has been shown to be correlated with higher levels of right-wing and extremist right
support, especially among the poorer and less educated population (Corneo 2010; Decker
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et al. 2014; Falk et al. 2011; Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Shayo 2009).
The argument also generalizes to the overall perceived threat of migrants to the natives,
e.g. also because they bring other attitudes and cultural traits with them (Berning and
Schlueter 2016; Decker et al. 2014; Konitzer and Grujić 2009). Interestingly, however,
people tend to react with less hostility to refugees (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006), and the
evidence on the relation between the influx of refugees and right-wing party preferences
is mixed (Konitzer and Grujić 2009; Sekeris and Vasilakis 2016; Steinmayr 2016). This
relation depends on, among other things, the integration of the refugees (Böhm et al.
2018; Konitzer and Grujić 2009; Steinmayr 2016), which can be facilitated by refugees’
own skills, a favorable economic situation in the host regions or cultural similarities
(Braun and Dwenger 2018; Cheung and Phillimore 2014; Gericke et al. 2018). At the same
time, the way the governments handle the influx of refugees echoes in right-wing party
preferences (Hälbig and Lorenz 2019; Steinmayr 2016). That being said, right-wing party
preferences and anti-migrant attitudes are not always fueled by the (actual) migration.
There is evidence for intergenerational transmission of these preferences – the channel
of preference persistence also discussed above (Avdeenko and Siedler 2017). Related to
this, Ochsner and Roesel 2016 show how refugees themselves having more nationalistic
attitudes influences the voting patterns of their host regions in the long term. This
finding connects directly to our hypothesis on the influence of the expelled East Prussians
in their host regions, as to be discussed below.
3 Historical background
The German presence in Eastern Europe dates back to the beginning of the thirteenth
century, when the Teutonic Order started its crusades against the pagan Baltic tribes
(Jasinski 1993). Prussian borders started taking more permanent shape in the fifteenth
century, with the eastern border determined in 1422 and remaining unchanged until the
end of World War I (Forstreuter 1955). In the west of Prussia, the fifteenth century
brought the Teutonic Order losses to the Polish Kingdom, and the second treaty of
Thorn in 1466 defined the Prussian border in the west and south for three centuries
to come, until the first partition of Poland in 1772. The centuries-long warfare led to
depopulation of the region by native Baltic peoples, especially in the eastern borderlands.
The population losses were mostly recovered through migration of the German population
into the region, thus leading to large-scale Germanization of Prussia (Forstreuter 1955).
In 1525, the Teutonic Order’s Grand Master Albert of Brandenburg converted to
Lutheranism and secularized the Prussian territories, converting Prussia into a hereditary
duchy, which was inherited by the elector of Brandenburg in 1618. In 1701, Frederic III
of the House of Brandenburg was crowned “King in Prussia” Frederic I in Königsberg,
uniting Brandenburg and Prussia into one Kingdom of Prussia. What was originally
the Duchy of Prussia would later become the province of East Prussia (Solsten 1996).
The borders of Prussia changed significantly around the turn of the nineteenth century.
Through the partition of Poland, it regained the territories lost through the treaty of
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Thorn, while also receiving substantial lands in the east and south. Some of these were,
however, lost to the Russian Empire during the Napoleonic wars. The borders set in the
Congress of Vienna would remain unchanged for a century, until the end of World War I.
Ever since the secularization of Prussia, the duchy, and later the province of East
Prussia, was the stronghold of German agricultural nobility (Berdahl 2014). While
industrialization transformed western regions of Germany throughout the nineteenth
century, East Prussia was almost untouched by this process. The main economic sector
was still agriculture, and most industry was mainly supplementary to it or was based on
raw materials produced locally or, especially towards the end of the century, imported
from the Russian Empire (Ambrassat 1912). Being located along the shore of the Baltic
Sea, East Prussia also had several important seaports, Königsberg being the main one.
The export goods were primarily grain and wood, again not only produced locally, but
also increasingly shipped from the Russian Empire by internal waterways (Ambrassat
1912). Thus, it is not surprising that, politically, East Prussia was also a stronghold of
conservatism and growing nationalism in the German Empire. It was one of the largest
supporters of conservative Lutheranism and, towards the second half of the nineteenth
century, with Russia rising as a direct competitor in agricultural production, also of
protectionist trade policy (Beck 1997).
In terms of population, the long history of Prussian state formation led to very high
demographic diversity in the east of the Kingdom of Prussia (and later of the German
Empire). Figure 2 shows an extract of a 1906 map of ethnicities in Central-Eastern
Europe. The border of the East Prussian province followed the course of the Vistula
river (German: Weichsel), yet shifted a few kilometers to the east, so that the city of
Elblag (German: Elbing) was at this border on the West Prussian side. Within the
nineteenth century borders, especially in the provinces of West Prussia, Posen and Silesia,
there was a substantial Polish population, leaving the Germans a minority in many areas
(especially in the countryside). East Prussia was much more homogenous, with an almost
purely German population in the north, but Polish majorities in some southern areas
and a slight Lithuanian majority in the Memel region (Eberhardt 2002). The complex
demographic structure in the south, however, differed from the Polish areas in other
German provinces. A large share of the East Prussian Poles were Evangelical Protestant
Masurians, who mostly considered themselves neither Polish nor German, even though
many adopted either Polish or German identity (Eberhardt 2002).
Thus, the national conflict rising in the German Empire at the end of the nineteenth
century touched East Prussia to a lesser extent. The suppression of the Catholic Church
through Bismarck’s Kulturkampf was less critical for the Protestant Poles, and the
predominance of Poles in areas where they were in the majority was usually not as
substantial as in other provinces, although the imperial policy of Germanization naturally
contributed to tensions in East Prussia too (Eberhardt 2002; Tilse 2011). Co-habitation
of Germans and Poles resulted in extensive cultural exchange, and much of the population
(especially among the Poles) was bilingual. Also, mixed marriages were quite common
in the Prussian East. Many Germans and Poles could adopt either Polish or German
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Figure 2: Ethnic groups in Central Europe in 1906
Notes: The color red denotes prevalence of German ethnic groups. Green and light green
denote prevalence of Polish and Russian/Belarussian populations, respectively. Gray
denotes prevalence of Lithuanian population. The bold gray line delineates the border of
the German Empire in 1906. Source: Scobel 1906, p. 31.
identity, depending on what was more advantageous in specific situations (Eberhardt
2002). Thus, for example, Tilse 2011 speaks of the process of cultural transnationalism,
instead of exchange or assimilation.
The situation was similarly less intense in the Memel region (in Figure 2, the area with
the Lithuanian majority in the north of East Prussia, between the Neman river (German:
Memel) and the state border). Despite the Lithuanian national identity generally having
developed relatively late (Staliunas 2016), most of the conflict on the Russian side
increased, while the population in Lithuania Minor (Memel region) did not actively
identify themselves with a Lithuanian nation. Even the naming of the “two” nations
was different in the Lithuanian language (Vareikis 2002). On top of that, Lithuanian
nationalist discontent was directed against the Polish population, predominant in the
south of Lithuania and in Vilnius, rather than against the Russians or Germans (Staliunas
2016; Vareikis 2002). As a result, the Lithuanians in the Memel region were much less
eager to separate from the German Empire and unite with Lithuania Major – the part of
Lithuania under Russian control (Vareikis 2002).
Border re-drawing in the 1919 Paris Conference in the aftermath of World War I was
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primarily based on the ethnicity principle, which resulted in huge territorial losses in
West Prussia, Posen and Silesia and, later, in silent acceptance of the separation of the
Memel region from East Prussia (compare also the borders of 1914 and 1933 in Figure 1).
The very mixed demographic structure in the south of East Prussia, however, made use
of ethnicity principle there virtually impossible, so the peacemakers had to take the will
of the majority of the population into account (Eberhardt 2002). While the results of
the plebiscite raised discontent in the reborn Polish state (Wrzesinski 1985), the outcome
was an almost unchanged southern and western border of East Prussia for a further
thirty years to come.1 During the interwar time, the German share of the population
in the Memel region gradually decreased, but, with generally good German-Lithuanian
relations, no massive outflows occurred (Eberhardt 2002; Nikzentaitis 2002).
An important outcome of the Versailles treaty, however, was the major discontent in
the German provinces about the new borders, especially those in the east, with this
remaining a public issue well after the treaty came into effect (Harvey 2000). Nationalistic
organizations and political parties actively used this issue in their rhetoric, especially
focusing on the preservation of the “Germandom” and military and cultural vulnerabilities
created by the new borders (Harvey 2000). In addition, the eastern provinces were largely
agricultural, making them more prone to nationalism due to both the overall lower
income level of the population (Friedrich 1937, see also Section 2) and the farmers’
high dependence on their place of birth (Friedrich 1937). With Germany already being
in a difficult economic situation as a result of after-war hyperinflation and unsettled
reparations issues, the Great Depression aggravated the economic distress. East Prussia,
now also in its disadvantageous position as an exclave, suffered severely from the crisis
(Harvey 2000). By 1933, East Prussia became one of the major supporters of the
nationalists (see also Figure C.3 in the Appendix).
The German territorial losses in the East were drastic after World War II. The rest of
East Prussia first became a Soviet occupation zone and then was divided between Poland
(constituting the Warmińsko-Mazurskie voivodship) and the Soviet Union (with the city
of Königsberg, renamed Kaliningrad). As the Soviet army advanced into East Prussia in
early 1945, the inhabitants massively fled from their homes. Those who had remained in
the occupied areas east of the Oder-Neisse line until the end of the war were expelled in
the next few years. The majority of Germans left East Prussia by the end of 1945, as
shown in Table 1 for East Prussia as a whole and each of its districts (Regierungsbezirke).
Especially before their expulsion by the Polish and the Soviet governments, the easiest
way for people to leave East Prussia was by way of the Baltic Sea. Thus the entry points
for the East Prussian expellees in the West were mostly in the north of Germany. As a
result, in West Germany most of the East Prussian expellees landed in Bremen, Hamburg,
and the states of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony.
The massive inflow of the population from the former eastern provinces – but also from the
Soviet occupation zone – required that the West German authorities be actively involved
1In fact, the western border of East Prussia was moved further west to accommodate a small part left
in the east of the former West Prussia into the province.
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Table 1: The number of refugees from East Prussia, 1944-1955
East Prussia total RB Königsberg RB Gumbinnen RB Allenstein
1944 185701 25118 134326 24886
Jan 1945 551734 305129 33585 117951
May 1945 74725 33620 13954 19084
Aug 1945 32817 11546 2250 14419
1946 23834 7997 1681 5358
1947 19924 12828 908 4154
1948 11105 9020 958 934
1949 843 408 131 217
1950 526 118 119 209
1951 111 59 29 10
1952 121 49 18 42
1953 391 116 81 151
1954 278 109 27 122
1955 210 43 29 118
Source: Besser 2007
in managing this migration. They determined the places of settlement for the expellees
and refugees, with local economic conditions playing a minor role – the choice was mostly
driven by the availability of housing (Braun and Dwenger 2018). The expellees were then
prohibited from changing their residence until 1947, after which they could only move
with the permission of the authorities. The relocation ban was completely lifted in May
1949, with the result that the geographical distribution of expellees was almost the same
in 1950 as in 1946 (Braun and Dwenger 2018). East Germans (including East Prussians)
were quite similar to the native West German population in most socio-demographic
characteristics (such as age and education) (Braun and Dwenger 2018). However, they
were distinguishable, for example, by their eastern dialect and often treated as foreigners
in their host settlements (Glück and Sauer 1997). The distribution of the East Prussian
expellees was highly uneven across the states of West Germany, reaching up to almost
15% of the total population in some districts of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony
but barely exceeding 2% in the southern states (see Figure 3).
Back in East Prussia, of some 1.2 million of its former German inhabitants, a total
of a few thousand remained in the three new states throughout the Cold War period
(Eberhardt 2002; Zyromski 1985). The demographic shock was somewhat less severe in
Lithuania, since as early as 1925 only 43.5% of the population in the Memel region was
German, and this share decreased even further during the interwar period (Eberhardt
2002, p. 40). Also, unlike Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania was little affected by Soviet
internal migration. Some Russian population came to the republic throughout the Soviet
period, mainly as employees in the bureaucracy, military staff and technical staff working
on industrialization plans. These migrants, however, remained quite dispersed across
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Figure 3: Share of East Prussian expellees in FRG population, 1950
Source: Authors’ work. Base map: MPIDR and CGG 2011a, population data: see Table
A.1
towns and in the countryside, and their total share was kept very low by the fast natural
growth of the Lithuanian population (Eberhardt 2002).
In Poland and the Kaliningrad region, on the other hand, the aftermath of the war meant
an almost complete exchange of population. In the new Polish Warmińsko-Mazurskie
voivodship, no more than 25% of the population were pre-war residents. The huge loss
was recovered mainly through in-migration from the Warsaw region and former eastern
Poland (which was ceded to the Soviet Belarus after the Second World War) and largely
comprised a younger population (Zyromski 1985). In the Kaliningrad region, the effect
was even more devastating, as the north of East Prussia was a predominantly German
region before the war. Population replacement there was complete. While loyalty to the
regime of course played a role in the choice of the settlers, the choice of source regions
for resettlement tended to be driven by convenience: the Russian-speaking population
mostly came in from the regions of Pskov and Smolensk, and in rural areas also from
the “black earth” region in Central Russia and Ukraine, which combined proximity to
Kaliningrad and a relatively high population density (Diener and Hagen 2011; Eberhardt
2002).
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After the fall of the Iron Curtain, migration was quite mild, relative to what happened
during and after World War II. For example, in Poland, the total yearly number of
newcomers in internal migration between voivodships rarely reached 2% of the incumbent
population.2 Several thousand ethnic Germans appeared in the first post-Soviet census,
but, it seems, these tended to be bilingual Germans, who proclaimed themselves Polish
after the war to avoid expulsion (Eberhardt 2002). Moreover, their share in the total
(Polish) population was still negligible. Similarly, a few thousand ethnic Germans moved
to Kaliningrad from other regions of the former Soviet Union, but here too they were
too few to constitute any meaningful minority (Eberhardt 2002). Thus, one can safely
assume that the current population in former East Prussia is mostly comprised of the
descendants of after-war migrants. In Lithuania, however, there is still a substantial
share of descendants of pre-WWI inhabitants.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Hypotheses
While our case focuses on the legacy of one region, instead of the long-term effects
of borders, the underlying question is quite similar. Our expectation is that culture
is persistent. It is transmitted directly by people in their families, but also indirectly
through neighborhood socialization and the choice of the socialization environment. A
solid theoretical foundation for both direct and indirect channels was suggested by Bisin
and Verdier 2001. Moreover, as the literature discussed in Section 2 suggests, not only
does it take decades to level out the differences created by varying institutional settings,
but it also takes a similarly long time to create such differences by installing varying
institutional settings in the first place. More specifically, we might expect that the legacies
of East Prussia are persistent and still traceable in all three states under consideration.
One can apply the argument of imperial legacies, with long-lasting institutional impact,
not only to differences within one modern country, but also to our opposite case. Some
features of East Prussia apply more to this particular province and less to the German
Empire as a whole (and even less so to the diverse regions of the Russian Empire). Thus,
we may expect that:
Hypothesis 1. In modern Lithuania, Poland and Russia, the regions located in former
East Prussia and those located outside former East Prussia show differences in culture as
captured by political preferences and entrepreneurial activity.
At the same time, given the relative homogeneity within East Prussia, we can also expect
that the regions formerly located in East Prussia are even more similar across the modern
state borders if intergenerational transmission takes place:
2Authors’ calculation based on official Polish statistics.
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Hypothesis 2. In modern Lithuania, Poland and Russia, the regions located in former
East Prussia are less different across the modern borders than regions located outside
former East Prussia.
The idea behind the persistence argument is that, even though the population structure
was mixed in some areas of East Prussia, cultural assimilation (or cultural transna-
tionalism) between the Germans and the Poles or Lithuanians, respectively, provided
for a certain level of homogeneity in values. By simple historical predominance of the
German population in East Prussia and through the effects of German schooling, the
relations developed more in direction of Germanization of the Polish and Lithuanian
population than vice versa. Thus, even if the German population moved out of the region,
the remaining Germanized Poles and Lithuanians would transmit the attitudes to their
descendants, and also possibly to the migrants coming into the region. In addition, the
political and ideological systems were quite similar in all three states between 1945 and
1989, as Lithuania was directly a part of the Soviet Union and Poland was largely under
Soviet control. Thus, for more than a half of the partitioning period, the possibilities for
the three states to drift apart were limited. The divergence was more likely to unfold
during the transition period.
The major argument against any persistence is, of course, the scale of the after-war
demographic shock. With most of the population decimated in the regions ceded to
Poland and the Soviet Union, remaining inhabitants were likely too few to transfer any
values to the migrants coming to fill the demographic vacuum. If anything, they might
have been more likely to assimilate with the migrants if these had any unifying value
sets.3 Given the scale of the demographic shock in the Polish and Soviet parts of East
Prussia, it is likely that the patterns of persistence postulated in Hypotheses 1 and 2 will
not be present to the same degree in the three countries under investigation.
Furthermore, in view of the transmission channel discussed above, the follow-up question
we pose is: Did East Prussian migrants affect the voting patterns in West Germany,
either through their own preferences or through the reaction of the native population
to the migration inflow? The inter-generational transmission of values postulated as
the main channel in most studies of persistence is based on individuals’ values and
preferences. While being forced to leave home for a new region is certainly, among other
effects, a massive psychological shock, there is little reason to believe that the values a
person developed during his/her entire life would be completely reversed by this shock.
3Another argument might be that the development during the Soviet era was shaped by military
interests, especially in Kaliningrad as the main Soviet naval base in the Baltic Sea. While this
role of Kaliningrad definitely had an impact on economic development in the region and the city
of Kaliningrad was essentially a closed military area until the 1980s (Diener and Hagen 2011), the
hinterland resembled the countryside in other Soviet regions, and the focus on military manufacturing
can well be considered a mirror to the general disequilibrium in the Soviet economy, with excessive
attention to heavy industry. Structural and regional imbalances were characteristic for all of the Soviet
Union (Escoe 1995). Thus, while the military importance of Kaliningrad might have contributed to
the creation of new identities and values in the region, it is unlikely to be the most important factor.
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Therefore, we hypothesize that the political preferences were affected in the regions where
the East Prussian refugees found their new homes immediately after the war:
Hypothesis 3. The regions in the FRG that hosted more East Prussian refugees were
characterized by more conservative political preferences and higher support for nationalistic
parties shortly after World War II.
4.2 Data
We have collected statistical data on political and socioeconomic outcomes in Lithuania,
Poland and Russia. The political data are compiled from official statistics and are treated
as cross-section datasets, even though the elections do not coincide in all three countries.
We, however, chose elections whose timing was closest to each other, and focused on the
period before 2014, so that the outcomes are not influenced by the deteriorating East-West
relations or entry of openly populist parties and candidates into governmental bodies.
We consider parliamentary elections of 2011 (Poland, Russia) and 2012 (Lithuania) as a
cross-sectional dataset. The data include the turnout and the number of votes for each of
the parties, which we coded along the political spectrum (left-right position) and ideology
(liberal, conservative, nationalist, etc.). We can, thus, calculate the share of votes that
conservative or nationalistic parties received in respective elections. While we admit that
survey data on political preferences would reflect the attitudes better than the political
outcomes, we are limited by the geographical representation of such surveys, which is
critical for an analysis of the attitude differences in this relatively small region. The
election data on very low levels of administrative division are, however, readily available.
The dataset for Russia is compiled at the county (raion) level, which is the second level of
administrative division. In addition, due to the country size, we only look at the counties
within former East Prussia and in the neighboring regions of the western mainland of
Russia (regions of Leningrad, Smolensk, Bryansk, Pskov and Kursk). For Lithuania and
Poland, the data are available at the third level of administrative division (gmina) in
Poland and for polling districts in Lithuania. As a result, we analyze a total of 158
counties in Russia, 2480 gminas in Poland and 2000 polling districts in Lithuania. Figure
4 offers a visualization of our political dataset for Lithuania, Poland and Russia with
respect to conservative political preferences and in relation to the former East Prussian
region (for electoral turnout and nationalist political preferences see the respective Figures
C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix).
With respect to economic outcomes, we collect data on the number of enterprises in
different sectors based on the first level of the NACE Rev. 2 classification. In the case
of Lithuania, the data on sectoral employment are additionally available. It is also the
most geographically detailed dataset, based on a grid map of Lithuania, with the size
of grid cell equal to one kilometer. With four years of data from 2015 to 2018, this
generates a total of 29,963 observations. In the case of Poland, the data are based on the
administrative divisions and are collected for gminas for the years 2015-2017, with a total
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Figure 4: Share of votes for conservative parties in parliament elections in Lithuania
(2012), Poland, and Russia (2011): East Prussia and neighboring regions
Source: Authors’ work. Base map: GADM & ESRI Gray, election data: see Table A.1
of 7,434 observations. Finally, in the case of Russia, the data are collected for districts
(raions), as is the case for electoral data too. Some districts are missing, however, and
the classification of sectors was only harmonized with the NACE classification of 2017.
Thus, with the two years of data, we are left with 274 observations.
In order to explore Hypothesis 3, we collect the data on the 1949 Bundestag election
results by electoral districts, which we code along the ideologies of participating parties
so as to calculate the share of votes received by conservative and nationalistic parties. To
calculate the density of the East Prussian refugees, we use the number of refugees from
each former eastern province in each of the West German districts (Kreise) reported in the
population census of 1950 (Braun and Dwenger 2018). We then calculate the share of each
province’s migrants in the total population. To control for other socioeconomic variables
and political preferences before the war, we also utilize the electoral and socioeconomic
data of 1920-1933 compiled by Falter and Hänisch 1990. The Kreise are then aggregated
to 194 “mega-districts” to handle the geographical mismatch between the electoral and
the administrative districts. Figure 5 offers a visualization of our political dataset for
West Germany with respect to conservative political preferences (for nationalist political
preferences see Figure C.4 in the Appendix).
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Figure 5: Share of votes for conservative parties in parliament elections in the FRG, 1949
Source: Authors’ work. Base map: MPIDR and CGG 2011a, election data: see Table
A.1
4.3 Methodology
Our approach is mainly based on a regression discontinuity design. The underlying
assumption is that the border of former East Prussia is exogenous. Throughout the
formation of the Prussian state, the borders were determined by warfare and negotiations
with Poland, Lithuania and later the new neighbor, Russia, and often cut through
historical ethnic areas. After World War II, the border between Poland and the Soviet
Union did not follow any ethnic or economic criteria either, but rather was determined
by the balance of power and strategic military considerations. The only case where a
border was more or less determined by ethnic composition of the area’s population, was
the separation of the Memel region through quiet acceptance of Lithuanian annexation.
However, as we showed in the previous section, the German population in the region
was quite substantial, and the Lithuanian population was Germanized. The argument of
inherent national unity with Lithuania Major was thus questionable. Lithuanian influence
in the Memel region was indeed weaker than the German in the interwar period (Vareikis
2002). In addition, the new border quite conveniently followed the course of the Neman
River, although there were also some predominantly Lithuanian areas south of the river,
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which remained in East Prussia (see also Figure 2). Therefore, we can safely assume that
the borders of both East Prussia and the successor states were drawn exogenously.
4.3.1 Robust RDD in Poland & Lithuania
The absence of territorial continuity between the Kaliningrad region and Russia does not
allow us to perform the robust regression discontinuity design as introduced by Calonico,
Cattaneo, Farrell, et al. 2017. We use Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014; Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2015 only for the Polish and Lithuanian data. Thus, our baseline
regression is:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, (1)
where 𝑌𝑖 is the electoral or economic outcome: turnout, share of votes for conservatives,
share of votes for nationalists and number of economic entities in an economic sector.
𝑋𝑖 is the set of additional controls such as city dummy, altitude, latitude and longitude.
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 denotes the distance from the centroid of the territorial unit to the East
Prussian border, which is the forcing variable in our model. The interaction term
𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎∗𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 shows that the distance of each territorial unit to the East
Prussian border varies with its historical attachment to East Prussia.
4.3.2 CEM in Russia
We correct for the territorial discontinuity between the Kaliningrad region and the rest
of Russia by introducing Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) to compare economic and
political outcomes between Kaliningrad, on the one hand, and neighboring Russian
regions such as Pskov, Leningrad, Smolensk, Briansk and Kursk, on the other (Datta
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where 𝐿1 ∈ [0, 1] is the measure of multivariate imbalance, 𝑓(𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑘) denotes the relative
multivariate frequency distributions of treatment units and 𝑔(𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑘) denotes the relative
multivariate frequency distributions of control units in k-dimensional space. Furthermore,
if 𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖(𝑇𝑖 = 1) − 𝑌𝑖(𝑇𝑖 = 0)|𝑋𝑖, where 𝑇𝐸𝑖 is the treatment effect, 𝑌𝑖 the outcome
variable, 𝑇𝑖 the treatment variable and 𝑋𝑖 the set of pre-treatment covariates, then we








where 𝑚𝑇 is the number of matched treated units and 𝑇
𝑚 the subset of matched treated
units (ibid.). The main advantage of the CEM method is that it does not require the
common pre-treatment trends for both treatment and control observations, and there is
no data extrapolation (Datta 2015).
4.3.3 Similarities in East Prussia
To investigate Hypothesis 2, we use an approach similar to the regression discontinuity
design for a pooled dataset on Lithuania, Poland and Russia. Because of this pooling,
however, we have to account for the differences between the countries. We do so by
introducing the country dummies and differentiating between the effects of East Prussia
in the three countries:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1𝐿𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑖+
𝛾1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛾2𝐸𝑃
∗
𝑖 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,
(3)
where 𝑌𝑖 is the electoral outcome: turnout, share of votes for conservatives and share of
votes for nationalist parties. 𝐿𝑇𝑖 and 𝑃𝐿𝑖 are 1 for Lithuania and Poland, respectively,
and 0 otherwise (Russia serves as a base), 𝐿𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑖 and 𝑅𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑖 are 1 for regions
in Lithuania, Poland and Russia, respectively, located in former East Prussia and 0
otherwise. Note that they are additive to the overall country effects, meaning the
cumulative effect of being, for example, in Lithuania in former East Prussia is 𝛼+𝛽1+𝛽3.
Similarly, one can also calculate the effects for the other two countries. 𝑋𝑖 is the set
of additional controls, such as city dummy, latitude and longitude. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 denotes
the distance from the centroid of the territorial unit to the East Prussian border, and
the interaction term 𝐸𝑃 ∗𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 shows that the distance of each territorial unit to
the East Prussian border varies with its historical attachment to East Prussia. We only
perform this exercise for the political outcomes, as the economic outcomes are not directly
comparable across countries due to the differences in collecting the statistics.
In terms of Hypothesis 1, such a regression should deliver results similar to the RDD
and CEM approaches discussed above. Its advantage, however, is that such pooling and
the use of interaction terms allows us to test statistically if the effects we observe for
particular groups (e.g. regions in former East Prussia) are different.
4.3.4 Political preferences in the FRG
We use the geographic variation in the number of East Prussian refugees in the FRG
to identify the effect of the East Prussian migration on the voting results in the first
parliament elections after the end of World War II. We consider this variation exogenous
for, as discussed above, the settlement pattern was determined by geography and the
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settlement decisions of authorities, mostly dependent on housing availability (hence, indi-
rectly on war damage). We run robust OLS regressions of the vote shares of conservative
and nationalistic parties on the share of East Prussian refugees in the total population,
controlling for other refugees, large cities, age and gender structure, religion, prewar
electoral patterns, and economic structure of the respective districts. Based on data
availability for the control variables, some further geographic aggregation was necessary,
and so in most specifications we end up with 162 regions to analyze. The basic regression
is:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, (4)
where 𝑌𝑖 is the electoral outcome in 1949, 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑖 is the share of East
Prussian refugees in the host region 𝑖, and 𝑋𝑖 is the set of control variables outlined
above.
With possible concerns that, despite the way most of the expellees left their home province
and how they were settled by the authorities, their distribution in West Germany might
still be endogenous, we also check for the robustness of our results with an IV regression,
using latitude as an instrument for the share of East Prussians in the total population. The
latitude reflects the evacuation routes over the Baltic Sea and the respective settlements
primarily in the North of Germany very well and, based on the Montiel-Pflueger test,
appears to be a strong instrument for the geographical distribution of the East Prussian
expellees.
Finally, since spatial data are being analyzed, there is a possible concern that any results
we find are not driven by the independent variables but by the spatial autocorrelation
between the regions. As Kelly 2019 suggests, spatial autocorrelation can exaggerate
the t-statistics and the Conley procedure does not fully correct this, mostly because
either only one neighboring region is given non-zero weight in the adjustment or the
cutoff radius for the zero weight is set very low (and so still too few regions get non-zero
weights). Taking this into account, we test for spatial dependence in our data and check
the robustness of our OLS results with a spatial autoregressive model (SAR), using
the inverse distance to weight the covariance matrix and not setting any cut-off on the
weights. Thus, we assume decreasing but non-zero mutual influence of the regions that
are further apart.
5 Persistence in former East Prussia
We first concentrate on economic and political outcomes at the historical borders of East
Prussia within modern-day Poland and Lithuania. It is obvious that the internal Polish-
East Prussian border reveals no statistical significance when it comes to several areas of
entrepreneurial activity (see Table B.3 and Figure C.7 in the Appendix). Nevertheless,
political outcomes in what used to be East Prussia within the boundaries of contemporary
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Table 2: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East
Prussia





Conventional −0.061∗∗∗ 0.018 −3.42 −0.096 −0.026 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.046∗∗ 0.018 −2.59 −0.081 −0.011 2479
Robust −0.046∗ 0.028 −1.68 −0.100 0.008 2479
Polska Jest
Najważniejsza
Conventional −0.009∗ 0.005 −1.71 −0.018 0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.014∗∗∗ 0.005 −2.72 −0.023 −0.004 2479
Robust −0.014 0.009 −1.46 −0.032 0.005 2479
Platforma
Obywatelska RP
Conventional 0.068∗∗∗ 0.026 2.60 0.017 0.119 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.058∗∗ 0.026 2.22 0.007 0.109 2479
Robust 0.058 0.040 1.47 −0.019 0.136 2479
Prawica Conventional 0.001 0.001 1.38 0.000 0.002 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.001 0.001 1.19 −0.001 0.002 2479
Robust 0.001 0.001 0.72 −0.002 0.003 2479
Nowa Prawica Conventional −0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 −3.43 −0.007 −0.002 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 −4.66 −0.008 −0.003 2479
Robust −0.006∗∗∗ 0.002 −3.04 −0.010 −0.002 2479
Turnout Conventional −0.038∗∗ 0.016 −2.37 −0.069 −0.006 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.035∗∗ 0.016 −2.22 −0.066 −0.004 2479
Robust −0.035 0.022 −1.62 −0.078 0.007 2479
Conservative Share Conventional −0.060∗∗∗ 0.018 −3.32 −0.096 −0.025 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.045∗∗ 0.018 −2.51 −0.081 −0.010 2479
Robust −0.045 0.028 −1.63 −0.100 −0.009 2479
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional −0.005 0.020 −0.25 −0.043 0.033 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.007 0.020 −0.34 −0.045 0.032 2479
Robust −0.007 0.029 −0.23 −0.063 0.050 2479
Nationalist Share Conventional −0.061∗∗∗ 0.018 −3.42 −0.096 −0.026 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.046∗∗ 0.018 −2.59 −0.081 −0.011 2479
Robust −0.046∗ 0.028 −1.68 −0.100 0.008 2479
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.
Poland differ significantly from respective political outcomes on the Polish side of the East
Prussian–Polish border. Table 2 and Figure 6 show the estimation results for conservative,
liberal-conservative and nationalistic parties (the results for all parties can be viewed in
Table B.1 and Figure C.5 in the Appendix). As these results indicate, in the territories
of pre-war Poland, the conservative party Prawo i Sprawiedliwośc (Law and Justice) vote
share is higher by a mean difference of 4.6 percentage points, statistically significant at
the 5% level with a bias-corrected confidence interval (CI) and at the 10% level with a
robust CI. Similarly, in the territories of pre-war Poland, the liberal-conservative party
Polska Jest Najważniejsza (Poland Comes First) vote share is higher by a mean difference
of 1.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the 1% level with a bias-corrected CI,
that of the labor party Polska Partia Pracy - Sierpień 80 higher by a mean difference
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Figure 6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs.
East Prussia
of 0.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level with a bias-corrected
CI, and that of the socialist party Nasz Dom Polska (Our Home Poland) higher by a
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mean difference of 0.2 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level with a
bias-corrected CI.
Furthermore, aggregated conservative and nationalist vote shares in the territories of
pre-war Poland are also higher than those in former East Prussia by an average difference
of 4.5 and 4.6 percentage points, respectively, which is statistically significant at the 5%
level with a bias-corrected CI. The vote share of the right-wing party Nowa Prawica
(Congress of the New Right) is also higher in the pre-war territories of Poland and the same
observation holds for electoral turnout, an indication of a politically mobilized society.
In contrast, the vote share of the party Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left
Alliance) is higher in former East Prussia by an average difference of 2.6 percentage
points, which is statistically significant at the 1% level with both bias-corrected and
robust CIs. Similarly, the vote share in former East Prussia is higher for the liberal party
Ruch Palikota by a mean difference of 1.9 percentage points, statistically significant at
the 1% level with a bias-corrected CI and at the 10% level with a robust CI. The vote
share of the liberal-conservative Platforma Obywatelska RP is higher in “Polish East
Prussia” by a mean difference of 5.8 percentage points, statistically significant at the
5% level with a bias-corrected CI. Several robustness checks including covariates such as
city dummy, latitude and longitude or an increase of the border bandwidth from 60 km
to 100 km do not change the baseline findings reported for both economic and political
outcomes (see Tables B.11-B.13 in the Appendix).
Overall, the East Prussian lands of modern Poland reveal lower levels of political conser-
vatism and support for nationalistic parties compared to the pre-war Polish territories
on the other side of the border. “Polish East Prussia” appears to be more progressive
rather than conservative in terms of electoral results. This, in fact, is the opposite of
Hypothesis 1. The former East Prussian territories do not show a higher level of economic
institutions either, as indicated by entrepreneurship in the sectors of information and
communication, real estate activities, professional and scientific activities, financial and
insurance activities, and other services.
When we evaluate the internal East Prussian border in Lithuania, we find that, in terms
of economic outcomes, only enterprises offering professional and scientific services appear
to be more developed on the East Prussian side of the border, with a mean difference of
2.289, statistically significant at the 1% level both with bias-corrected and robust CIs
(see Table B.4 in the Appendix). Financial and insurance enterprises do not reveal any
significant difference in terms of their frequency across the historical border, whereas real
estate enterprises, information & communication as well as other services are significant
in the opposite direction, i.e. reveal a discontinuity in favor of the pre-war Lithuanian
territories (see also Table B.4 in the Appendix). With respect to political outcomes,
the results are presented in Table 3 and Figure 7 for conservative, liberal-conservative
and nationalistic parties and in Table B.2 and Figure C.5 in Appendix for all parties in
the sample. We find that, in the pre-war Lithuanian territories, the Social Democratic
Party vote share is higher by an average difference of 6.2 percentage points, statistically
significant at the 5% level both with bias-corrected and robust CIs. A similar observation
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Table 3: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs.
East Prussia





Homeland Union Conventional −0.028*** 0.011 −2.65 −0.049 −0.007 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.039*** 0.011 −3.68 −0.060 −0.018 2000
Robust −0.039*** 0.013 −2.91 −0.067 −0.013 2000
Liberals Movement Conventional −0.0004 0.013 −0.04 −0.027 0.026 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.034** 0.013 −2.57 −0.060 −0.008 2000
Robust −0.034** 0.017 −2.03 −0.067 −0.001 2000
Order & Justice Conventional −0.104*** 0.037 2.79 0.031 0.177 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.128*** 0.037 3.42 0.055 0.201 2000
Robust −0.128*** 0.044 2.87 0.040 0.214 2000
Poles’ Electoral
Action
Conventional −0.004*** 0.002 −2.54 −0.007 −0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.027*** 0.002 −17.45 −0.030 −0.024 2000
Robust −0.027*** 0.002 −11.70 −0.032 −0.023 2000
Peasant & Greens
Union
Conventional −0.001 0.012 −0.10 −0.025 0.023 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.011 0.012 0.91 −0.013 0.035 2000
Robust 0.011 0.016 0.70 −0.020 0.042 2000
Liberal & Centre
Union
Conventional −0.008 0.005 −1.59 −0.017 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.007 0.005 −1.37 −0.016 0.003 2000
Robust −0.007 0.006 −1.15 −0.018 0.005 2000
Christian Party Conventional −0.006** 0.003 −2.06 −0.011 0.000 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.005* 0.003 −1.86 −0.010 0.000 2000
Robust −0.005 0.003 −1.47 −0.012 0.002 2000
National
Association
Conventional −0.003 0.002 −1.52 −0.006 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.004** 0.002 −2.35 −0.008 −0.001 2000
Robust −0.004* 0.002 −1.78 −0.009 0.000 2000
Young Lithuania Conventional −7.0×10-6 0.001 −0.01 −0.002 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected 4.3×10-5 0.001 0.04 −0.002 0.002 2000
Robust 4.3×10-5 0.001 0.03 −0.002 0.003 2000
Turnout Conventional −0.011 0.019 −0.59 −0.049 0.026 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.013 0.019 −0.67 −0.051 0.025 2000
Robust −0.013 0.024 −0.54 −0.060 0.034 2000
Conservative Share Conventional 0.093** 0.036 2.58 0.023 0.164 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.106*** 0.036 2.94 0.036 0.177 2000
Robust 0.106** 0.042 2.53 0.024 0.189 2000
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional 0.057* 0.030 1.88 −0.002 −0.660 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.026 0.030 0.87 −0.033 0.085 2000
Robust 0.026 0.037 0.72 −0.046 0.098 2000
Nationalist Share Conventional 0.073** 0.034 2.13 0.006 0.140 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.084*** 0.034 2.45 0.017 0.151 2000
Robust 0.084** 0.042 2.01 0.002 0.166 2000
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.
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holds for the Homeland Union and the Liberals Movement; the mean difference is 3.9 and
3.4 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Moreover, vote shares of parties such as The Way of Courage, Order and Justice, Poles’
Electoral Action, Socialist People’s Front, National Association and the Emigrants’ Party
are significantly higher on the pre-war Lithuanian side of the border. However, the
Labor Party exhibits an average difference of 6.1 percentage points in favor of East
Prussian territories in Lithuania, which is statistically significant at the 5% level with a
bias-corrected CI and at the 10% level with a robust CI. Similarly, the conservative vote
share is higher in the former East Prussian territories of Lithuania by a mean difference
of 10.6 percentage points, statistically significant with a bias-corrected CI at the 1% level
and with a robust CI at the 5% level. The nationalist vote share is also higher in the same
direction by an average difference of 8.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the
1% level with a bias-corrected CI and at the 5% level with a robust CI. We introduce
several robustness checks here as well by changing the border bandwidth from 60 km
to 100 km and by introducing covariates in the robust RDD such as city dummy, city
distance, latitude and longitude (see Tables B.17-B.19 in the Appendix). Our initial
results (Tables 3 and B.2 as well as Figures 7 and C.6) are reinforced.
The Lithuanian border confirms our first hypothesis in terms of the dynamics of East
Prussian persistence. Political, and to a lesser extent economic, outcomes suggest the
presence of an East Prussian legacy that favors more advanced economic institutions and
higher levels of political conservatism and support for nationalistic parties. Rather than
offering a linear narrative of post-imperial persistence, what we find is that the extent
of the demographic shock may be a powerful predictor of long-run persistence. While
populations usually follow the path of a defeated army and evacuate territories that are
conceded to the rival military adversary as a result of an international truce or treaty,
what is crucial is the prior existence of ethnic and linguistic diversity in the province or
territory conceded, its prior sectoral and resource structure, and the degree of violence
of the population transfer per se. This is why Poland deviates much more significantly
from the hypothesis of East Prussian persistence in situ than Lithuania.
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Figure 7: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs.
East Prussia
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We now turn to the case of Russia. As already mentioned above, the matching algorithm
CEM allows us to coarsen the values of the covariates with the purpose of equalizing
the number of treated and control units within each stratum of the covariates (Datta
2015; Iacus et al. 2009). As shown in Tables 4-5 as well as in Tables B.5-B.6, we run two
different matching exercises, one with city dummy and altitude as the set of covariates
(Match I) and another one with an augmented set of covariates including the distance to
the Russian border (Match II). As Figure 8 indicates, coarsening includes many more
strata in the second rather than in the first matching model. The same observation
holds for economic outcomes (see Figure C.9). When it comes to political outcomes
compared between Kaliningrad and the neighboring – and territorially discontinuous
– Russian regions, Table 4 reports 17 treated units matched to 40 control units with
a post-matching multivariate imbalance of 1.874∗10−16. Similarly, Table 5 reports 13
treated units matched to 19 control units with a post-matching imbalance of 0.25. When
we evaluate comparative economic outcomes with the CEM algorithm, we find that the
degree of matching efficiency between the treated and control units is lower. Table B.5
reports 38 treated units matched to 64 control units with a post-matching multivariate
imbalance of 0.232, while Table B.6 shows 28 treatment units matched to 20 control units
with a post-matching multivariate imbalance of 0.679.
Table 6 summarizes the political effect of East Prussia for two different matching models.
Assuming constant treatment across strata, we estimate the local sample average treatment
effect on the treated units (LSATT) both for Match I and Match II. We find that, for
United Russia, there is an increase of 7.7 percentage points in Match I, statistically
significant at the 1% level, while there is an increase of 5.4 percentage points in Match
II, statistically significant at the 10% level. In other words, the share of votes given to
the United Russia party is higher in former East Prussia (the Kaliningrad region). For
the party Patriots of Russia, there is a statistically significant increase of 0.5 percentage
points at the 1% level. The conservative vote share is also significantly higher in the
Figure 8: CEM weights vs. strata (political outcomes)
(a) Match I (b) Match II
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Table 4: Political matching results for Russian East Prussia (Kaliningrad) coarsening,
Match I
Treated Control







measure: L1 = 1.874×10-16
Univariate imbalance measures:
Variable L1 Mean Min 25% 50% 75% Max
City 1.00×10-17 -2.10×10-17 0 0 0 0 0
Altitude 1.80×10-16 -2.244 16 -6 0 -6 -17
Table 5: Political matching results for Russian East Prussia (Kaliningrad) coarsening,
Match II
Treated Control







measure: L1 = 0.25
Univariate imbalance measures:
Variable L1 Mean Min 25% 50% 75% Max
City 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Altitude 0.026 -4.276 -2 -11 -5 -11 -17
Distance to the Russian
border (rescaled)
0.083 -0.080 0.15 -0.067 -0.1 0.067 -0.567
Kaliningrad region than in the neighboring regions of Russia in our sample: in Match
I there is an increase of 7.7 percentage points, statistically significant at the 1% level,
and in Match II an increase of 5.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the 10%
level. The results of the conservative vote appear to be driven by the United Russia
vote share. The nationalist vote share is higher in Kaliningrad as well, producing an
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Table 6: Political estimates of East Prussian impact in Russia (Kaliningrad)
Outcome Matching
Model
Coefficient Std. Err. t N R-
squared
United Russia Match I 0.077∗∗∗ 0.021 3.74 57 0.202
Match II 0.054∗ 0.031 1.78 29 0.105
LDPR Match I 0.004 0.006 0.62 57 0.007
Match II 0.001 0.010 0.09 29 0.000
CPRF Match I 0.027∗∗ 0.012 2.32 57 0.089
Match II 0.012 0.014 0.88 29 0.028
Just Russia Match I −0.098∗∗∗ 0.014 −7.17 57 0.483
Match II −0.059∗∗∗ 0.019 −3.19 29 0.274
Yabloko Match I −0.016∗∗∗ 0.006 −2.75 57 0.121
Match II −0.013∗∗ 0.005 −2.65 29 0.207
Patriots of Russia Match I 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 5.49 57 0.354
Match II 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 3.60 29 0.324
Right Cause Match I −0.0002 0.000 −0.54 57 0.005
Match II 0.0001 0.001 0.17 29 0.001
Turnout Match I 0.020 0.015 1.36 57 0.032
Match II −0.002∗ 0.022 −0.08 29 0.000
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Match I 0.077∗∗∗ 0.020 3.77 57 0.206
Match II 0.054∗ 0.030 1.81 29 0.108
Nationalist Share Match I 0.081∗∗∗ 0.018 4.50 57 0.269
Match II 0.055∗∗ 0.024 2.26 29 0.159
Conservative Share Match I 0.077∗∗∗ 0.021 3.74 57 0.202
Match II 0.054∗ 0.031 1.78 29 0.105
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
increase of 8.1 percentage points in Match I, statistically significant at the 1% level, and
an increase of 5.5 percentage points in Match II, statistically significant at the 5% level.
The liberal-conservative vote share shows the same results as the conservative share.
Similarly, more progressive and left-wing parties receive higher vote shares in western
Russian regions of our sample other than in Kaliningrad. The vote shares of Just Russia
and Yabloko exhibit a decrease of 9.8 percentage points and 1.6 percentage points,
respectively, in Match I, statistically significant at the 1% level for both parties. In Match
II, we observe a decrease of 5.9 percentage points for Just Russia and of 1.3 percentage
points for Yabloko, statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Figure
9 visualizes Table 6 both for Match I and Match II. Table B.7 and Figure C.10 present
matching results and LSATT estimates for economic outcomes in Kaliningrad and its
control western Russian regions. Our results show no pattern of persistence in terms
of institutions-intensive entrepreneurial activity in Kaliningrad. The respective LSATT
estimates of information and communication, real estate activities, professional and
scientific activities, financial and insurance activities, and other services are either
statistically insignificant or point in the opposite direction (real estate activities). Hence,
we observe that the political legacy of East Prussia persists in Kaliningrad in the form
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Figure 9: Post-CEM regressions (political outcomes)
(a) Match I (b) Match II
of conservative politics and a significant role for nationalist politics, while there is no
persistence of German economic institutions in entrepreneurial activity.
Turning to our analysis of the pooled sample (as in specification (3)), the results are
presented in Table 7 for the full sample and a sample in which Russia is excluded
(denoted LTPL). We experimented with excluding Russia due to a possible objection
that the Russian (“hybrid-democratic”) political system is not comparable to that of
Lithuania and Poland. Exclusion of Russia, however, has no significant effect on the
other results. Similar to the RDD and the CEM results, regions in East Prussia tend
to vote less conservatively and nationalistically in Poland and more conservatively and
nationalistically in Lithuania and Russia. All these effects are highly significant, except
for nationalistic voting in Russia. Interestingly, Lithuania and Poland in general tend to
vote more conservatively than Russia. Lithuanian regions also tend to lend less support to
nationalistic parties than Russia and less support to both conservative and nationalistic
parties than Poland.
At the bottom of Table 7, we also measure pairwise if Lithuania, Russia and Poland are
statistically distinguishable inside East Prussia and, for the full sample, if Lithuania and
Poland are distinguishable outside East Prussia. The latter measure is also repeated
through the Lithuanian country effect in the smaller sample, and the coefficients are
quite close. As could be expected, all three countries are significantly different from each
other both inside and outside former East Prussia. An interesting result, however, is that
the difference between Lithuania and Poland in East Prussia seems to be less in absolute
terms than that outside East Prussia. The last three lines of Table 7, therefore, also
report pairwise the difference in absolute disparities between the modern countries within
versus outside East Prussia. It is important to note that we only compare the magnitude
of the disparity in this case, even if East Prussian and non-East Prussian effects go in
different directions. The negative coefficient means that the country difference within
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Table 7: Estimation results for East Prussia, pooled sample
Sample Full Full Full LTPL LTPL LTPL
Dependent variable turnout cons. national. turnout cons. national.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LT 0.004 0.052** −0.283∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗* −0.253*** −0.171***
(0.014) (0.027) (0.019) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
PL −0.077*** 0.266*** −0.134
(0.017) (0.034) (0.025)
LTEP −0.053*** 0.110*** 0.099*** −0.052*** 0.125*** 0.103***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013)
PLEP −0.054*** −0.070*** −0.088*** −0.061*** −0.083*** −0.101***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
RUEP 0.052* 0.443*** 0.180
(0.031) (0.044) (0.032)
City 0.053*** −0.021*** −0.002 0.057*** −0.020*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005)Dist. to EP border
(tkm) 0.071*** 0.285*** 0.065*** 0.083*** 0.348*** 0.082***
(0.012) (0.024) (0.020) (0.013) (0.024) (0.021)Dist. to EP border
(EP) (tkm) −0.032 −1.493*** −1.187*** 0.106 −1.358*** −1.004***
(0.092) (0.290) (0.248) (0.311) (0.256) (0.240)
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4637 4637 4637 4479 4479 4479
R-squared 0.366 0.244 0.341 0.354 0.221 0.200
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LT vs RU in EP −0.100*** −0.280*** −0.364***
PL vs. RU in EP −0.182*** −0.247*** −0.401***
LT vs. PL in EP 0.082*** −0.033** 0.037*** 0.079*** −0.045*** 0.033***
LT vs. PL outside EP 0.081*** −0.214*** −0.150***
Δ LT vs. RU in EP /
outside EP
0.096*** 0.227*** 0.081***
Δ PL vs. RU in EP /
outside EP
0.105*** −0.020 0.268***
Δ LT vs. PL in EP /
outside EP
0.001 −0.180*** −0.112*** 0.009 −0.208*** −0.138***
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
LT = Lithuania, PL = Poland, RU = Russia, EP = East Prussia, LTEP = Lithuania in East
Prussia, PLEP = Poland in East Prussia, RUEP = Russia in East Prussia.
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East Prussia is smaller than outside it, whereas the positive coefficient indicates a larger
difference within East Prussia. Indeed, we find Lithuania and Poland are more similar
within East Prussia than outside it with respect to conservative and nationalistic voting.
They are, however, indistinguishable in this regard with respect to turnout. At the
same time, both Lithuania and Poland seem to be more different from Russia within
East Prussia than they are outside it. Thus, our results both support and contradict
Hypothesis 2. Given the history of the region, this might also reflect how the scale of the
demographic shock, together with pre-shock diversity, affects cultural persistence.
For Lithuania and Poland, we also repeated the exercise limiting the sample to a bandwidth
of 60 km and 100 km from the East Prussian border, which brings the specifications even
closer to the RD design. The results are reported in Table B.20 in the Appendix and
are fully in line with the results reported above . Moreover, within these smaller bands,
Lithuania and Poland become statistically indistinguishable from each other within East
Prussia with respect to conservative voting and, for the bandwidth of 100 km, also with
regard to nationalistic voting. This lends more support for Hypothesis 2 in the region
with more geographic proximity, more initial diversity and a (somewhat) lower scale of
the demographic shock.
6 Migrating East Prussians
The results for the voting behavior in the FRG after World War II are presented in Table 8
for conservative voting and Table 9 for nationalist voting. For the sake of brevity, we only
present the specifications with relevant control variables. For conservative voting, we find
a significant positive effect of the share of East Prussians in the district population on the
share of votes the conservative parties receive. The coefficient is statistically significant
and highly stable, and this result is robust across a variety of specifications, including
IV-estimations. We thus conclude that the presence of the East Prussian expellees in
West Germany indeed resulted in more conservative voting, which is consistent with the
hypothesized conservative political preferences of the East Prussian population. The
effect appears even stronger when we control for the presence of refugees from the other
Eastern provinces (compare specifications (1) and (2) in Table 8).
The results for nationalistic voting also support our hypotheses. Namely, the share of the
East Prussian expellees in the total district population is positively related to the share
of votes the nationalistic parties received in 1949. This result is also highly robust, with
only one exception: controlling simultaneously for the share of workers as well as shares
of agriculture and of trade and financial sector in the economy renders the effect of the
East Prussian expellees insignificant (but still positive) in the IV-specification. Given
the high correlation between these three controls, however, and the fact that this is the
only combination that influences the significance of the result, it is unclear whether it is

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In view of the literature discussed in Section 2, the explanation for this positive relation
can be twofold. On the one hand, this may be the reaction of the native West German
population to the semi-foreigners from the Eastern provinces. This is supported by
the prevalence of positive relations to refugees from other provinces (except Berlin and
Pomerania, partially statistically significant effects) and is in line with the research on
immigration and right-wing voting (see Section 2). On the other hand, as the share of
nationalistic voting in the 1920s and 1930s predicts the respective patterns after the
war in the West German states, so may the high prewar support of nationalistic parties
in East Prussia (see, e.g., Figure C.3 in the Appendix) convert to higher support of
nationalistic parties by the East Prussian expellees in 1949.
As a “placebo” test, we also regress the share of East Prussian expellees on the share
of votes for nationalistic and conservative parties in 1933, as reported in Table B.23 in
the Appendix, and find that the share of East Prussian expellees is negatively related to
the conservative vote, although the relationship becomes positive if further controls are
added. In contrast, the share of East Prussians is positively related to the nationalistic
vote, both with and without controls. Adding the controls takes away about half of the
effect. Thus, there must be some unobservable variables affecting both the (long-term)
voting patterns and the settlement of the refugees. However, if we use the IV approach
(with latitude as an instrument), as in the main regression, the explanatory power of the
“placebo“ regression drops substantially, and the coefficient on the share of East Prussians
approaches zero. This is not the case with the main regression and lends support to our
IV approach.
There are several possible objections to the results presented. The first is the issue of
self-selection, which may both influence the choice of place of residence and reflect a
selection bias in preferences. In these circumstances, however, we consider this bias very
small, if any. As discussed in Section 3, almost all the surviving population of East
Prussia had to leave the area, and so the possibility to self-select into migration did not
exist. The expellees could not choose their place of residence strategically either, due to
settlement by the military authorities and the subsequent relocation ban, as discussed
earlier in Section 3 too. Furthermore, our IV approach tackles this problem well.
Another possible – and very valid – objection is that the question of the eastern provinces
was not quite settled by the time of the first Bundestag election. It might be the case that
the East Prussian expellees voted for the parties who favored the support and integration
of the refugees in West Germany and who refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line. The
former is barely a concern, as essentially all parties expressed the necessity of proper
integration in their programs. Only some very regionally focused parties with a relatively
small electoral base, like the Bavarian Party (Bayerische Partei), expressed a demand not
to receive the expellees and/or to send them back. Still, even they typically acknowledged
that those who had already been settled should have the possibilities to integrate in the
social and economic life in their host regions Mintzel 1986. The acceptance of the new
borders was not that universal, however. Some of the parties explicitly claimed in their
electoral programs that the eastern territories (both, the Soviet occupation zone and
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the former eastern provinces) should belong to Germany, some did not take any side on
this question, while the communist party explicitly stated the Oder-Neisse line should
not be revised. We thus used the party programs and/or their closed session resolutions
and singled out the parties that were explicitly against the Oder-Neisse line. We then
checked the robustness of our result with respect to the conservative vote by splitting the
sample into parties rejecting the Oder-Neisse line and those not doing so. This exercise
was not possible with respect to the nationalistic parties as there were only two of them,
one being negligibly small. We did, however, test whether the presence of the East
Prussian expellees is positively related to voting for parties against the Oder-Neisse line
independently of their ideology.
We present the test results in Table B.21 in the Appendix. Indeed, voting for parties
against the Oder-Neisse line is positively related to the share of the East Prussian
expellees in the total population, even after controlling for other expellee groups and
socioeconomic characteristics of the districts. This result holds both for conservative
parties and in general for all parties that expressed a position against the new borders.
At the same time, the effect of the East Prussian expellees on voting for conservative
parties who did not declare a position with regard to the Oder-Neisse line is insignificant.
This might seem to overturn our finding of support for conservative parties in favor of
revision of the new borders. However, a closer look at the composition of parties rejecting
the Oder-Neisse line shows that the positive results are completely driven by the German
Party (Deutsche Partei), which was both conservative, nationalistic and against the new
borders. The effect of the East Prussian presence on the group of parties against the new
borders does not withstand the exclusion of the German Party: the coefficient becomes
insignificant when controlling for the other expellees and even changes the sign when not
controlling for the other expellees (see specifications (7) and (8) in Table B.21). At the
same time, voting for the German party is consistently positively related to the share
of East Prussians, both when taking the full sample and when restricting it only to the
regions where the party was actually present: Bremen, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and
Lower Saxony, which are also the regions with high shares of East Prussians (see Table
B.22 in the Appendix).
Another argument against voting for border revision only is that there were several parties
that expressed their position against the Oder-Neisse line but were not conservative or
nationalistic, with the liberal FDP (Free Democratic Party/Freie Demokratische Partei)
being most explicit among all parties in its demand to return the eastern provinces to
Germany while supporting the Eastern expellees in their host regions (FDP 1948; FDP
1949). At the same time, as noted above, the communist party (KPD) explicitly stated
that the revision of the borders would endanger peace and should not be attempted
(Parteivorstand der KPD 1949). Had the East Prussian expellees voted primarily in the
hope of restoring the old borders, we would see a positive relationship to voting for FDP
and a negative relationship to voting for KPD. This is, however, not the case. In fact,
the share of East Prussians is negatively related to the FDP share, as could be expected
given the hypothesized East Prussian conservative preferences (see Table B.22 in the
Appendix). This result is robust across several specifications. At the same time, there is
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no consistent relationship between the share of East Prussians and voting for KPD: the
negative effect vanishes once the shares of other expellees are controlled for.
We, therefore, conclude that the positive relationship between conservative voting and the
share of East Prussians in the district population is not completely driven by the parties’
position with regard to the new German borders. Neither is nationalistic voting likely to
be driven only by the dissent of the native population, as the German Party, for which
there is the strongest positive relation with the share of East Prussians, demanded proper
integration and support for the refugees (Mommsen 1960). As such, the German Party
had a strong standing among the expellees, including the East Prussians. It expressed
rather conservative and nation-centered views, demanded good living conditions for the
refugees, declared Germany to be both to the west and to the east of the Oder-Neisse line,
and above all, drew a lot of members from the associations of the Prussian-conservative
DKP/DRP and provided “political shelter” to the expellees, who were not yet allowed to
form their own parties (Mommsen 1960; Schmollinger 1986).
The robustness check with the spatial autoregression largely confirms our findings. The
Moran’s I-test indicates both for the conservative and nationalist shares that there is
spatial dependence.4 The overview of the SAR results can be found in Table B.24 in the
Appendix. For the conservative share of votes, the results are robust to individual and
any combination of the spatial lags of the dependent and independent variable and of
the error term. The direct effect of the share of East Prussian expellees is comparable
to that in the OLS estimations, while the total effect is mostly even larger. For the
share of votes for nationalistic parties, the results are robust to spatial lags of the share
of East Prussians and of the error term, but not to the lag of the dependent variable.
Inclusion of the latter inflates the standard errors, especially of the indirect effect, and
thus no conclusive evidence is obtained. At the same time, this result depends on the
estimation method: using robust maximum likelihood instead of the generalized spatial
two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) generates more moderate standard errors. The direct
effect of East Prussian expellees is also close to that in the OLS estimations throughout
all specification. Still, the outlier result of the spatial lag of the dependent variable calls
for some caution when interpreting the results for nationalistic voting.
7 Conclusion
While most economic research on cultural persistence investigates the long-term impacts
of different cultural or institutional environments within one modern state or across
otherwise similar states, our focus is on the opposite case. In this paper, we investigate
whether a relatively homogenous region can persist as such after being exposed to different
4The Moran test for the conservative share returns 𝜒2 = 19.14 (the independent variables were the share
of East Prussians, city, conservative share in 1920 and wage in East Prussia relative to host region).
The Moran test for the nationalistic share returns 𝜒2 = 8.83 (with the share of East Prussians, city,
nationalistic share in 1920 and wage in East Prussia relative to host region).
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political settings. While not questioning that the new regions diverge, we ask whether
this divergence is slowed down by common history.
We find that legacies of former East Prussia only partially persist in the region in the
case of both political and economic outcomes. This persistence greatly depends on how
much of the original East Prussian population was left in the area and who filled the
demographic vacuum created by World War II and the partitioning of the province. We
find most evidence for persistence in Lithuania, where the departure of the German
population was much more gradual, stretching over 25 years. There is little evidence
for economic persistence in Poland or Russia. In fact, in Poland, also in the case of
political preferences, our hypothesis of persistence is rejected. Moreover, we find that
the flight and expulsion of the East Prussian population in the aftermath of the Second
World War changed the political outcomes in the first parliamentary election in the
West German regions where the expellees were settled. This finding implicitly supports
the idea of intergenerational transmission as the main persistence channel, but also
advocates caution in the interpretation of persistence in Eastern Europe. With the
massive population movements in the mid-twentieth century, it might be tempting to
describe culture as persistent, where it is actually more likely to be determined by a
selection bias of migration.
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Table A.1: Data profile and sources
Variable Unit Period Data source Notes



















% 2012 The Central Electoral
Commission of the
Republic of Lithuania
Share of people voting for: Order and
Justice; Lithuanian Poles’ Electoral
Action; Lithuanian Peasant and





% 2011 National Electoral
Commission
Share of people voting for: Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice);





% 2011 Central Election
Commission of the
Russian Federation






% 2012 The Central Electoral
Commission of the
Republic of Lithuania
Share of people voting for: Order and
Justice; Lithuanian Poles’ Electoral
Action; Lithuanian Peasant and
Greens Union; Christian Party;
’Young Lithuania’; Homeland Union -
Lithuanian Christian Democrats;
Liberals Movement of the Republic of
Lithuania; Liberal and Centre Union;






% 2011 National Electoral
Commission
Share of people voting for: Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice);
Prawica (Right Wing of the
Republic); Polska Jest Najważniejsza
(Poland Comes First); Platforma
Obywatelska RP (Civic Platform);
Nowa Prawica - Janusza
Korwin-Mikke (Congress of the New
Right)
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page





% 2011 Central Election
Commission of the
Russian Federation





% 2012 The Central Electoral
Commission of the
Republic of Lithuania
Share of people voting for: Homeland
Union - Lithuanian Christian
Democrats; Order and Justice;
National Association ’For Lithuania




% 2011 National Electoral
Commission
Share of people voting for: Prawo i




% 2011 Central Election
Commission of the
Russian Federation
Share of people voting for: United
Russia, LDPR




















Number of economic entities in
operation (Lithuania, Poland)
Number of reporting enterprises
(Russia)
Agriculture Number of economic entities by
economic activity: agriculture,
forestry and fishing
Manufacturing Number of economic entities by
economic activity: manufacturing,
mining and quarrying, and other
industry




Number of economic entities by
economic activity: wholesale and
retail trade, transportation and




Number of economic entities by




Number of economic entities by
economic activity: financial and
insurance activities
Real Estate Activities Number of economic entities by




Number of economic entities by
economic activity: professional,
scientific and technical activities,
administrative and support service
activities
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Unit Period Data source Notes
Public Administration Number of economic entities by
economic activity: public
administration and defense,
education, human health and social
work
Other Services Number of economic entities by
economic activity: other services
Political and socioeconomic data in West Germany
Conservative votes in
FRG
% 1949 Der Bundeswahlleiter
2016
Share of people voting for: Christian
Democratic Union (CDU); Christian
Social Union (CSU); German Party
(DP); Centre Party (Zentrum);
German Conservative Party /
German Right Party (DKP/DRP)
Nationalistic votes in
FRG
% 1949 Der Bundeswahlleiter
2016
Share of people voting for: German
Party (DP); European People’s
Movement in Germany (EVD)
Share of expellees in
FRG districts
% 1950 Braun and Dwenger
2018
Share of expellees from East Prussia,
Berlin, East Brandenburg, Silesia, or




% 1920-1933 Falter and Hänisch
1990
Conservative parties: share of people
voting for Centre / Bavarian People’s
Party (separate parties until 1928);
German National People’s Party;
Christian Social People’s Service
(from 1930)
Nationalistic parties: share of people
voting for NSDAP (from 1928);





East Prussia vs. FRG
districts
% 1939 Falter and Hänisch
1990
Share of employees in industry,
agriculture, or entrepreneurship in
total employment – ratio of the share




% 1950 Schmitt et al. 1994 Share of males; young people (aged
15-20); old people (aged over 65);




% 1950 Schmitt et al. 1994 Share of workers; entrepreneurs;
employees in agriculture, industry,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3: Descriptive statistics: Individual parties
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lithuania
Labor Party 2,000 0.248 0.110 0.029 0.760
Social Democratic Party 2,000 0.201 0.101 0.000 0.779
Homeland Union 2,000 0.131 0.069 0.000 0.487
Liberals Movement 2,000 0.066 0.051 0.000 0.343
The Way of Courage 2,000 0.067 0.046 0.000 0.294
Order & Justice 2,000 0.089 0.075 0.000 0.635
Poles’ Electoral Action 2,000 0.050 0.146 0.000 0.950
Peasant & Greens Union 2,000 0.062 0.069 0.000 0.811
Liberal & Centre Union 2,000 0.023 0.031 0.000 0.383
Union YES 2,000 0.012 0.015 0.000 0.157
Socialist People’s Front 2,000 0.011 0.013 0.000 0.153
Christian Party 2,000 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.171
National Association 2,000 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.150
Young Lithuania 2,000 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.053
Democratic Labor & Unity Party 2,000 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.063
Emigrants’ Party 2,000 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.030
Republican Party 2,000 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.156
People’s Party 2,000 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.064
Poland
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 2,479 0.332 0.124 0.040 0.829
Polska Jest Najważniejsza 2,479 0.020 0.012 0.003 0.199
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 2,479 0.082 0.049 0.003 0.529
Ruch Palikota 2,479 0.089 0.031 0.014 0.226
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 2,479 0.163 0.109 0.011 0.766
Polska Partia Pracy - Sierpien 80 2,479 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.077
Platforma Obywatelska RP 2,479 0.290 0.135 0.000 0.703
Nasz Dom Polska 2,479 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.042
Nowa Prawica 2,479 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.086
Prawica 2,479 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.048
Russia
United Russia 158 0.475 0.116 0.257 0.936
LDPR 158 0.131 0.033 0.015 0.207
CPRF 158 0.204 0.048 0.035 0.318
Just Rusia 158 0.150 0.056 0.011 0.315
Yabloko 158 0.025 0.019 0.001 0.118
Patriots of Russia 158 0.011 0.004 0.000 0.032
Right Cause 158 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.010
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B Estimation results
B.1 Persistence in East Prussia
Table B.1: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs.
East Prussia (all parties)







Conventional −0.061∗∗∗ 0.018 −3.42 −0.096 −0.026 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.046∗∗ 0.018 −2.59 −0.081 −0.011 2479
Robust −0.046∗ 0.028 −1.68 −0.100 0.008 2479
Polska Jest
Najważniejsza
Conventional −0.009∗ 0.005 −1.71 −0.018 0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.014∗∗∗ 0.005 −2.72 −0.023 −0.004 2479
Robust −0.014 0.009 −1.46 −0.032 0.005 2479
Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej
Conventional 0.021∗∗∗ 0.007 3.06 0.008 0.035 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.026∗∗∗ 0.007 3.82 0.013 0.040 2479
Robust 0.026∗∗∗ 0.009 3.04 0.009 0.044 2479
Ruch Palikota Conventional 0.029∗∗∗ 0.007 4.23 0.016 0.043 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.019∗∗∗ 0.007 2.66 0.005 0.032 2479
Robust 0.019∗ 0.010 1.92 0.000 0.037 2479
Polskie Stronnictwo
Ludowe
Conventional −0.039 0.025 −1.59 −0.088 0.009 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.032 0.025 −1.31 −0.081 0.016 2479
Robust −0.032 0.036 −0.91 −0.103 0.038 2479
Polska Partia Pracy
– Sierpień 80
Conventional −0.004∗ 0.002 −1.90 −0.007 0.000 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.004∗∗ 0.002 −2.06 −0.008 0.000 2479
Robust −0.004 0.003 −1.55 −0.009 0.001 2479
Platforma
Obywatelska RP
Conventional 0.068∗∗∗ 0.026 2.60 0.017 0.119 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.058∗∗ 0.026 2.22 0.007 0.109 2479
Robust 0.058 0.040 1.47 −0.019 0.136 2479
Nasz Dom Polska Conventional −0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 −2.79 −0.005 −0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.002∗∗ 0.001 −2.03 −0.004 0.000 2479
Robust −0.002 0.001 −1.39 −0.005 0.001 2479
Prawica Conventional 0.001 0.001 1.38 0.000 0.002 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.001 0.001 1.19 −0.001 0.002 2479
Robust 0.001 0.001 0.72 −0.002 0.003 2479
Nowa Prawica Conventional −0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 −3.43 −0.007 −0.002 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 −4.66 −0.008 −0.003 2479
Robust −0.006∗∗∗ 0.002 −3.04 −0.010 −0.002 2479
Turnout Conventional −0.038∗∗ 0.016 −2.37 −0.069 −0.006 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.035∗∗ 0.016 −2.22 −0.066 −0.004 2479
Robust −0.035 0.022 −1.62 −0.078 0.007 2479
Conservative Share Conventional −0.060∗∗∗ 0.018 −3.32 −0.096 −0.025 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.045∗∗ 0.018 −2.51 −0.081 −0.010 2479
Robust −0.045 0.028 −1.63 −0.100 −0.009 2479
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Table B.1 – continued







Conventional −0.005 0.020 −0.25 −0.043 0.033 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.007 0.020 −0.34 −0.045 0.032 2479
Robust −0.007 0.029 −0.23 −0.063 0.050 2479
Nationalist Share Conventional −0.061∗∗∗ 0.018 −3.42 −0.096 −0.026 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.046∗∗ 0.018 −2.59 −0.081 −0.011 2479
Robust −0.046∗ 0.028 −1.68 −0.100 0.008 2479
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.
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Table B.2: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs.
East Prussia (all parties)





Labor Party Conventional 0.059** 0.026 2.27 0.008 0.110 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.061** 0.026 2.36 0.010 0.112 2000
Robust 0.061* 0.033 1.84 −0.004 0.127 2000
Social Democratic
Party
Conventional −0.105*** 0.024 −4.29 −0.153 −0.057 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.062** 0.024 −2.55 −0.110 −0.014 2000
Robust −0.062** 0.032 −1.97 −0.125 0.000 2000
Homeland Union Conventional −0.028*** 0.011 −2.65 −0.049 −0.007 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.039*** 0.011 −3.68 −0.060 −0.018 2000
Robust −0.039*** 0.013 −2.91 −0.067 −0.013 2000
Liberals Movement Conventional −0.0004 0.013 −0.04 −0.027 0.026 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.034** 0.013 −2.57 −0.060 −0.008 2000
Robust −0.034** 0.017 −2.03 −0.067 −0.001 2000
The Way of
Courage
Conventional −0.010 0.007 −1.30 −0.024 0.005 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.023*** 0.007 −3.13 −0.038 −0.009 2000
Robust −0.023** 0.010 −2.39 −0.042 −0.004 2000
Order & Justice Conventional −0.104*** 0.037 2.79 0.031 0.177 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.128*** 0.037 3.42 0.055 0.201 2000
Robust −0.128*** 0.044 2.87 0.040 0.214 2000
Poles’ Electoral
Action
Conventional −0.004*** 0.002 −2.54 −0.007 −0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.027*** 0.002 −17.45 −0.030 −0.024 2000
Robust −0.027*** 0.002 −11.70 −0.032 −0.023 2000
Peasant & Greens
Union
Conventional −0.001 0.012 −0.10 −0.025 0.023 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.011 0.012 0.91 −0.013 0.035 2000
Robust 0.011 0.016 0.70 −0.020 0.042 2000
Liberal & Centre
Union
Conventional −0.008 0.005 −1.59 −0.017 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.007 0.005 −1.37 −0.016 0.003 2000
Robust −0.007 0.006 −1.15 −0.018 0.005 2000
Union YES Conventional 0.007 0.005 1.45 −0.002 0.016 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.010** 0.005 2.02 0.000 0.019 2000
Robust 0.010 0.006 1.49 −0.003 0.022 2000
Socialist People’s
Front
Conventional −0.004*** 0.001 −3.57 −0.007 −0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.007*** 0.001 −5.63 −0.009 −0.004 2000
Robust −0.007*** 0.002 −4.25 −0.010 −0.004 2000
Christian Party Conventional −0.006** 0.003 −2.06 −0.011 0.000 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.005* 0.003 −1.86 −0.010 0.000 2000
Robust −0.005 0.003 −1.47 −0.012 0.002 2000
National
Association
Conventional −0.003 0.002 −1.52 −0.006 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.004** 0.002 −2.35 −0.008 −0.001 2000
Robust −0.004* 0.002 −1.78 −0.009 0.000 2000
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Table B.2 – continued





Young Lithuania Conventional −7.0×10-6 0.001 −0.01 −0.002 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected 4.3×10-5 0.001 0.04 −0.002 0.002 2000
Robust 4.3×10-5 0.001 0.03 −0.002 0.003 2000
Democratic Labor
& Unity Party
Conventional −0.001 0.001 −0.73 −0.003 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.0003 0.001 0.32 −0.002 0.002 2000
Robust 0.0003 0.001 0.28 −0.002 0.003 2000
Emigrants’ Party Conventional −0.0003 0.001 −0.53 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.001* 0.001 −1.74 −0.002 0.000 2000
Robust −0.001 0.001 −1.49 −0.002 0.000 2000
Republican Party Conventional −0.0002 0.001 −0.39 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.0002 0.001 −0.37 −0.001 0.001 2000
Robust −0.0002 0.001 −0.29 −0.002 0.001 2000
People’s Party Conventional 0.0003 0.001 0.39 −0.001 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.0005 0.001 0.68 −0.001 0.002 2000
Robust 0.0005 0.001 0.56 −0.001 0.002 2000
Turnout Conventional −0.011 0.019 −0.59 −0.049 0.026 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.013 0.019 −0.67 −0.051 0.025 2000
Robust −0.013 0.024 −0.54 −0.060 0.034 2000
Conservative Share Conventional 0.093** 0.036 2.58 0.023 0.164 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.106*** 0.036 2.94 0.036 0.177 2000
Robust 0.106** 0.042 2.53 0.024 0.189 2000
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional 0.057* 0.030 1.88 −0.002 −0.660 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.026 0.030 0.87 −0.033 0.085 2000
Robust 0.026 0.037 0.72 −0.046 0.098 2000
Nationalist Share Conventional 0.073** 0.034 2.13 0.006 0.140 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.084*** 0.034 2.45 0.017 0.151 2000
Robust 0.084** 0.042 2.01 0.002 0.166 2000
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.
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Table B.3: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Poland
vs. East Prussia
Outcome Variable Method Coeffi-
cient
Std. Err. z 95% Confidence
Interval
N
Agriculture Conventional 4.616** 2.198 2.10 0.307 8.924 7434
Bias-Corrected −0.406 2.198 −0.18 −4.714 3.902 7434
Robust −0.406 2.857 −0.18 −6.006 5.195 7434
Manufacturing Conventional −11.542 12.442 −0.93 −35.927 12.843 7434
Bias-Corrected 4.904 12.442 0.39 −19.481 28.289 7434
Robust 4.904 13.629 0.36 −21.807 31.616 7434
Construction Conventional −0.172 15.274 −0.01 −30.108 29.764 7434
Bias-Corrected 13.461 15.274 0.88 −16.475 43.397 7434
Robust 13.461 16.94 0.79 −19.740 46.663 7434
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Conventional −63.149 47.570 −1.33 −156.384 30.087 7434
Bias-Corrected 8.756 47.570 0.18 −84.480 101.991 7434
Robust 8.756 50.425 0.17 −90.075 107.586 7434
Information &
Communication
Conventional −5.253 3.666 −1.43 −12.439 1.933 7434
Bias-Corrected 2.683 3.666 0.73 −4.503 9.869 7434
Robust 2.683 3.717 0.73 −4.602 9.969 7434
Financial &
Insurance Activities
Conventional −7.251 5.694 −1.27 −18.410 3.908 7434
Bias-Corrected 4.166 5.694 0.73 −6.994 15.325 7434
Robust 4.166 5.706 0.73 −7.019 15.350 7434
Real Estate
Activities
Conventional −8.160 19.374 −0.42 −46.132 29.812 7434
Bias-Corrected 8.298 19.374 0.43 −29.674 46.270 7434
Robust 8.298 19.954 0.42 −30.812 47.408 7434
Professional &
Scientific Activities
Conventional −32.301 19.339 −1.67 −70.205 5.602 7434
Bias-Corrected 15.761 19.339 0.82 −22.143 53.665 7434
Robust 15.761 19.274 0.82 −22.015 53.537 7434
Public
Administration
Conventional −16.464 20.089 −0.82 −55.839 22.910 7434
Bias-Corrected 20.355 20.089 1.01 −19.019 59.729 7434
Robust 20.355 21.307 0.96 −21.405 62.115 7434
Other Services Conventional −13.358 15.953 −0.84 −44.627 17.910 7434
Bias-Corrected 16.439 15.953 1.03 −14.830 47.707 7434
Robust 16.439 16.385 1.00 −15.675 48.552 7434
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
Bandwidth is 60 km.
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Table B.4: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Lithua-
nia vs. East Prussia
Outcome Variable Method Coeffi-
cient
Std. Err. z 95% Confidence
Interval
N
Agriculture Conventional −0.154*** 0.014 −10.90 −0.182 −0.127 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.161*** 0.014 −11.37 −0.189 −0.133 29963
Robust −0.161*** 0.020 −8.14 −0.200 −0.122 29963
Manufacturing Conventional −0.326*** 0.035 −9.42 −0.393 −0.258 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.272*** 0.035 −36.79 −1.339 −1.204 29963
Robust −1.272*** 0.053 −23.96 −1.376 −1.168 29963
Construction Conventional −0.429*** 0.031 −13.74 −0.490 −0.368 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.406*** 0.031 −45.02 −1.467 −1.344 29963
Robust −1.406*** 0.052 −27.06 −1.507 −1.304 29963
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Conventional −3.197*** 0.088 −36.20 −3.370 −3.024 29963
Bias-Corrected −6.974*** 0.088 −78.95 −7.147 −6.800 29963
Robust −6.974*** 0.151 −46.24 −7.269 −6.678 29963
Information &
Communication
Conventional −0.118*** 0.008 −14.11 −0.134 −0.101 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.297*** 0.008 −35.73 −0.314 −0.281 29963
Robust −0.297*** 0.014 −21.39 −0.325 −0.270 29963
Financial &
Insurance Activities
Conventional −0.047 0.004 −11.88 −0.054 −0.039 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.137 0.004 −34.84 −0.145 −0.129 29963
Robust −0.137 0.006 −22.48 −0.149 −0.125 29963
Real Estate
Activities
Conventional −0.539*** 0.020 −27.62 −0.577 −0.501 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.226*** 0.020 −62.83 −1.264 −1.187 29963
Robust −1.226*** 0.031 −39.27 −1.287 −1.164 29963
Professional &
Scientific Activities
Conventional −0.893*** 0.027 −32.69 −0.947 −0.840 29963
Bias-Corrected 2.289*** 0.027 −83.75 −2.343 −2.235 29963
Robust 2.289*** 0.046 −49.57 −2.38 −2.199 29963
Public
Administration
Conventional −0.770*** 0.024 −31.73 −0.818 −0.723 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.475*** 0.024 −60.76 −1.522 −1.428 29963
Robust −1.475*** 0.038 −38.67 −1.550 −1.400 29963
Other Services Conventional −1.067*** 0.044 −24.32 −1.153 −0.981 29963
Bias-Corrected −2.472*** 0.044 −56.35 −2.558 −2.386 29963
Robust −2.472*** 0.071 −34.75 −2.611 −2.332 29963
Number of
Employees
Conventional −103.13*** 9.426 −10.94 −121.59 −84.651 11569
Bias-Corrected −289.67*** 9.426 −30.73 −308.14 −271.19 11569
Robust −289.67*** 13.433 −21.56 −315.99 −263.34 11569
Income of
Economic Entities
Conventional 0.074 0.202 0.36 −0.322 0.469 5457
Bias-Corrected −0.397** 0.202 −1.97 −0.792 −0.001 5457
Robust −0.397 0.269 −1.48 −0.923 0.130 5457
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.
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Table B.5: Economic matching results for Russian East Prussia (Kaliningrad) coarsening,
Match I
Treated Control







measure: L1 = 0.232
Univariate imbalance measures:
Variable L1 Mean Min 25% 50% 75% Max
City 1.2×10-16 1.4×10-16 0 0 0 0 0
Altitude 0.147 -3.305 16 -6 -8 1 11
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Table B.6: Economic matching results for Russian East Prussia (Kaliningrad) coarsening,
Match II
Treated Control







measure: L1 = 0.679
Univariate Imbalance Measures:
Variable L1 Mean Min 25% 50% 57% Max
City 1.9×10-16 -5.6×10-17 0 0 0 0 0
Altitude 0.071 -3.196 -7 0 -2 1 11
Distance to the Russian
border (rescaled)
0.518 -0.012 0.002 -0.017 -0.015 0 0.002
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Table B.7: Economic estimates of East Prussian impact in Russia (Kaliningrad)
Outcome Matching
Model
Coefficient Std. Err. t N R-squared
Agriculture Match I −2.189*** 0.568 −3.86 102 0.130
Match II −1.938** 0.861 −2.25 48 0.099
Manufacturing Match I −10.779*** 3.032 −3.56 102 0.112
Match II −9.071** 4.289 −2.11 48 0.087
Construction Match I −1.095 0.838 −1.31 102 0.017
Match II 0.071 0.944 0.08 48 0.000
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Match I −7.211*** 2.304 −3.13 102 0.089
Match II −7.429** 3.467 −2.14 48 0.091
Information &
Communication
Match I −0.074 0.239 −0.31 102 0.001
Match II 0.214 0.383 0.56 48 0.007
Financial & Insurance
Activities
Match I 0.105 0.081 1.30 102 0.017
Match II 0.143 0.170 0.84 48 0.015
Real Estate Activities Match I −1.300** 0.648 −2.01 102 0.039
Match II −1.393* 0.736 −1.89 48 0.072
Professional & Scientific
Activities
Match I 0.100 0.517 0.19 102 0.000
Match II 0.571 0.979 0.58 48 0.007
Public Administration Match I −0.321 0.627 −0.51 102 0.003
Match II 0.071 0.871 −0.33 48 0.002
Other Services Match I −0.374 0.520 −0.72 102 0.269
Match II 0.071 0.871 0.08 48 0.000
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table B.8: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Poland
vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km
Outcome Variable Method Coeffi-
cient
Std. Err. z 95% Confidence
Interval
N
Agriculture Conventional 8.946*** 1.919 4.66 5.186 12.706 7434
Bias-Corrected 1.549 1.919 0.81 −2.211 5.309 7434
Robust 1.549 2.422 0.64 −3.197 6.295 7434
Manufacturing Conventional 26.726** 10.813 2.47 5.533 47.920 7434
Bias-Corrected −9.528 10.813 −0.88 −30.722 11.665 7434
Robust −9.528 16.513 −0.58 −41.893 22.837 7434
Construction Conventional 42.131*** 12.816 3.29 17.012 67.251 7434
Bias-Corrected −4.393 12.816 −0.34 −29.513 20.726 7434
Robust −4.393 19.305 −0.23 −42.230 33.443 7434
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Conventional 64.921 39.925 1.63 −13.331 143.172 7434
Bias-Corrected −70.617 39.925 −1.77 −148.869 7.634 7434
Robust −70.617 59.724 −1.18 −187.673 46.439 7434
Information &
Communication
Conventional 11.305*** 3.284 3.44 4.869 17.740 7434
Bias-Corrected −1.949 3.284 −0.59 −8.384 4.487 7434
Robust −1.949 6.166 −0.32 −14.034 10.137 7434
Financial &
Insurance Activities
Conventional 6.424 4.645 1.38 −2.680 15.289 7434
Bias-Corrected −6.135 4.645 −1.32 −15.240 2.969 7434
Robust −6.135 7.308 −0.84 −20.458 8.188 7434
Real Estate
Activities
Conventional 23.947 15.680 1.53 −6.784 54.679 7434
Bias-Corrected −2.229 15.680 −0.14 −32.961 28.502 7434
Robust −2.229 23.128 −0.10 −47.559 43.101 7434
Professional &
Scientific Activities
Conventional 37.988** 15.252 2.49 8.095 67.880 7434
Bias-Corrected −30.859** 15.252 −2.02 −60.752 −0.967 7434
Robust −30.859 27.440 −1.12 −84.640 22.921 7434
Public
Administration
Conventional 25.106 15.578 1.61 −5.427 55.639 7434
Bias-Corrected −16.484 15.578 −1.06 −47.017 14.049 7434
Robust −16.484 25.195 −0.65 −65.866 32.898 7434
Other Services Conventional 24.447** 12.355 1.98 0.232 48.662 7434
Bias-Corrected −19.572 12.355 −1.58 −14.830 4.643 7434
Robust −19.572 19.824 −0.99 −15.675 19.281 7434
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.
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Table B.9: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic
outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia
Outcome Variable Method Coeffi-
cient
Std. Err. z 95% Confidence
Interval
N
Agriculture Conventional 4.220* 2.228 1.89 −0.148 8.588 7434
Bias-Corrected −1.646 2.228 −0.74 −6.014 2.721 7434
Robust −1.646 2.898 −0.57 −7.326 4.034 7434
Manufacturing Conventional −7.503 11.291 −0.66 −29.633 14.628 7434
Bias-Corrected 7.994 11.291 0.71 −14.137 30.124 7434
Robust 7.994 12.770 0.63 −17.035 33.022 7434
Construction Conventional 5.784 13.565 0.43 −20.803 32.371 7434
Bias-Corrected 15.783 13.565 1.16 −10.803 42.370 7434
Robust 15.783 15.300 1.03 −14.205 45.771 7434
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Conventional −38.641 40.035 −0.97 −117.108 39.826 7434
Bias-Corrected 19.970 40.035 0.50 −58.498 98.437 7434
Robust 19.970 44.691 0.45 −67.624 107.563 7434
Information &
Communication
Conventional −3.578 3.093 −1.16 −9.640 2.485 7434
Bias-Corrected 3.377 3.093 1.09 −2.685 9.440 7434
Robust 3.377 3.081 1.10 −2.661 9.415 7434
Financial &
Insurance Activities
Conventional −4.703 4.811 −0.98 −14.132 4.726 7434
Bias-Corrected 5.515 4.811 1.15 −3.914 14.944 7434
Robust 5.515 5.176 1.07 −4.629 15.659 7434
Real Estate
Activities
Conventional −3.355 16.026 −0.21 −34.765 28.055 7434
Bias-Corrected 13.196 16.026 0.82 −18.214 44.606 7434
Robust 13.196 17.390 0.76 −20.887 47.279 7434
Professional &
Scientific Activities
Conventional −24.008 17.177 −1.40 −57.673 9.657 7434
Bias-Corrected 18.902 17.177 1.10 −14.763 52.568 7434
Robust 18.902 17.788 1.06 −15.962 53.767 7434
Public
Administration
Conventional −7.881 16.716 −0.47 −40.644 24.882 7434
Bias-Corrected 23.612 16.716 1.41 −9.151 56.375 7434
Robust 23.612 17.721 1.33 −11.120 58.344 7434
Other Services Conventional −6.252 13.283 −0.47 −32.287 19.784 7434
Bias-Corrected 19.801 13.283 1.49 −6.235 45.836 7434
Robust 19.801 14.250 1.39 −8.129 47.730 7434
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km. Covariates include
latitude, longitude and city dummy.
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Table B.10: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic
outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km
Outcome Variable Method Coeffi-
cient
Std. Err. z 95% Confidence
Interval
N
Agriculture Conventional 8.973*** 1.998 4.49 5.057 12.890 7434
Bias-Corrected 1.270 1.998 0.64 −2.647 5.186 7434
Robust 1.270 2.520 0.50 −3.669 6.208 7434
Manufacturing Conventional 36.294*** 13.345 2.72 10.138 62.450 7434
Bias-Corrected 2.532 13.345 0.19 −23.625 28.688 7434
Robust 2.532 19.124 0.13 −34.951 40.014 7434
Construction Conventional 55.194*** 14.294 3.86 27.178 83.209 7434
Bias-Corrected 8.034 14.294 0.56 −19.982 36.049 7434
Robust 8.034 20.850 0.39 −32.831 48.898 7434
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Conventional 113.620*** 43.082 2.64 29.186 198.063 7434
Bias-Corrected −28.895 43.082 −0.67 −113.334 55.544 7434
Robust −28.895 63.043 −0.46 −152.457 94.667 7434
Information &
Communication
Conventional 15.603*** 4.660 3.35 6.470 24.736 7434
Bias-Corrected 3.282 4.660 0.70 −5.851 12.414 7434
Robust 3.282 7.295 0.45 −11.017 17.580 7434
Financial &
Insurance Activities
Conventional 11.587 4.851 2.39 2.078 21.095 7434
Bias-Corrected −1.375 4.851 −0.28 −10.884 8.133 7434
Robust −1.375 7.575 −0.18 −16.222 13.472 7434
Real Estate
Activities
Conventional 33.687** 13.331 2.53 7.559 54.679 7434
Bias-Corrected 8.391 13.331 0.63 −17.737 28.502 7434
Robust 8.391 21.037 0.40 −32.841 49.623 7434
Professional &
Scientific Activities
Conventional 56.933*** 19.381 2.94 18.946 94.919 7434
Bias-Corrected −11.611 19.381 −0.60 −49.598 26.375 7434
Robust −11.611 30.803 −0.38 −71.985 48.762 7434
Public
Administration
Conventional 42.960*** 15.332 2.80 12.909 73.011 7434
Bias-Corrected −2.987 15.332 −0.19 −33.038 27.064 7434
Robust −2.987 24.437 −0.12 −50.883 44.908 7434
Other Services Conventional 38.256*** 11.754 3.25 15.218 61.294 7434
Bias-Corrected −8.894 11.754 −0.76 −31.932 14.144 7434
Robust −8.894 19.050 −0.47 −46.231 28.443 7434
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.
Covariates include latitude, longitude and city dummy.
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Table B.11: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs.
East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km





Conventional −0.078*** 0.015 −5.18 −0.107 −0.048 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.047*** 0.015 −3.11 −0.076 −0.017 2479
Robust −0.047** 0.021 −2.25 −0.087 −0.006 2479
Polska Jest
Najważniejsza
Conventional −0.007** 0.003 −2.09 −0.013 0.000 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.010*** 0.003 −3.14 −0.016 −0.004 2479
Robust −0.010* 0.009 −1.68 −0.021 0.002 2479
Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej
Conventional 0.017*** 0.006 2.86 0.005 0.029 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.022*** 0.006 3.69 0.011 0.034 2479
Robust 0.022*** 0.008 2.91 0.007 0.038 2479
Ruch Palikota Conventional 0.033*** 0.006 5.72 0.022 0.045 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.026*** 0.006 4.49 0.015 0.038 2479
Robust 0.026*** 0.008 3.33 0.011 0.042 2479
Polskie Stronnictwo
Ludowe
Conventional −0.049** 0.020 −2.40 −0.088 −0.009 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.032 0.020 −1.60 −0.072 0.007 2479
Robust −0.032 0.029 −1.13 −0.088 0.024 2479
Polska Partia Pracy
– Sierpień 80
Conventional −0.004** 0.001 −2.53 −0.006 0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.003** 0.001 −2.12 −0.006 0.000 2479
Robust −0.003 0.002 −1.41 −0.007 0.001 2479
Platforma
Obywatelska RP
Conventional 0.091*** 0.021 4.33 0.050 0.132 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.050** 0.021 2.38 0.009 0.091 2479
Robust 0.050 0.030 1.64 −0.010 0.110 2479
Nasz Dom Polska Conventional −0.003*** 0.001 −3.38 −0.005 −0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.003*** 0.001 −3.09 −0.004 −0.001 2479
Robust −0.003** 0.001 −2.26 −0.005 0.000 2479
Prawica Conventional 0.002*** 0.001 3.07 0.001 0.003 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.0002 0.001 0.44 −0.001 0.002 2479
Robust 0.0002 0.001 0.31 −0.002 0.002 2479
Nowa Prawica Conventional −0.004*** 0.001 −4.97 −0.006 −0.003 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.004*** 0.001 −4.98 −0.006 −0.003 2479
Robust −0.004*** 0.001 −3.15 −0.007 −0.002 2479
Turnout Conventional −0.020 0.014 −1.45 −0.047 0.007 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.051*** 0.014 −3.71 −0.077 −0.024 2479
Robust −0.051*** 0.019 −2.73 −0.087 −0.014 2479
Conservative Share Conventional −0.076*** 0.015 −4.97 −0.105 −0.046 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.045*** 0.015 −3.05 −0.076 −0.017 2479
Robust −0.045** 0.021 −2.21 −0.087 −0.005 2479
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional 0.004 0.016 0.26 −0.028 0.036 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.011 0.016 −0.66 −0.043 0.021 2479
Robust −0.011 0.023 −0.47 −0.056 0.034 2479
Nationalist Share Conventional −0.078*** 0.015 −5.18 −0.107 −0.048 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.047*** 0.015 −3.11 −0.076 −0.017 2479
Robust −0.047** 0.021 −2.25 −0.087 −0.006 2479
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.
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Table B.12: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political
outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia





Conventional −0.055*** 0.014 −3.99 −0.083 −0.028 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.052*** 0.014 −3.76 −0.080 −0.025 2479
Robust −0.052** 0.023 −2.29 −0.097 −0.008 2479
Polska Jest
Najważniejsza
Conventional −0.008 0.005 −1.61 −0.017 0.002 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.013*** 0.005 −2.64 −0.022 −0.003 2479
Robust −0.013 0.009 −1.42 −0.030 0.005 2479
Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej
Conventional 0.018*** 0.006 2.88 0.006 0.030 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.024*** 0.006 3.82 0.012 0.036 2479
Robust 0.024*** 0.008 3.16 0.009 0.039 2479
Ruch Palikota Conventional 0.030*** 0.005 5.45 0.019 0.041 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.022*** 0.005 4.07 0.012 0.033 2479
Robust 0.022*** 0.008 2.75 0.006 0.038 2479
Polskie Stronnictwo
Ludowe
Conventional −0.039* 0.023 −1.66 −0.085 0.007 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.038 0.023 −1.61 −0.084 0.008 2479
Robust −0.038 0.035 −1.09 −0.106 0.030 2479
Polska Partia Pracy
– Sierpień 80
Conventional −0.004** 0.002 −1.99 −0.007 0.000 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.004** 0.002 −2.07 −0.008 0.000 2479
Robust −0.004 0.003 −1.55 −0.009 0.001 2479
Platforma
Obywatelska RP
Conventional 0.063*** 0.022 2.87 0.020 0.106 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.066*** 0.022 3.02 0.023 0.109 2479
Robust 0.066* 0.036 1.86 −0.003 0.136 2479
Nasz Dom Polska Conventional −0.003*** 0.001 −2.77 −0.005 −0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.001 0.001 −1.50 −0.003 0.001 2479
Robust −0.001 0.002 −0.94 −0.005 0.002 2479
Prawica Conventional 0.001** 0.001 2.15 0.000 0.003 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.001* 0.001 1.77 0.000 0.002 2479
Robust 0.001 0.001 1.06 −0.001 0.003 2479
Nowa Prawica Conventional −0.004*** 0.001 −3.10 −0.006 −0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.005*** 0.001 −4.57 −0.008 −0.003 2479
Robust −0.005*** 0.002 −3.01 −0.009 −0.002 2479
Turnout Conventional −0.034** 0.016 −2.19 −0.065 −0.004 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.034** 0.016 −2.19 −0.065 −0.004 2479
Robust −0.034 0.022 −1.59 −0.077 0.008 2479
Conservative Share Conventional −0.054*** 0.014 −3.87 −0.082 −0.027 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.051*** 0.014 −3.66 −0.079 −0.024 2479
Robust −0.051** 0.023 −2.22 −0.097 −0.006 2479
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional −0.002 0.020 −0.12 −0.041 0.036 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.003 0.020 −0.15 −0.041 0.035 2479
Robust −0.003 0.029 −0.10 −0.060 0.054 2479
Nationalist Share Conventional −0.056*** 0.014 −3.99 −0.083 −0.028 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.052*** 0.014 −3.76 −0.080 −0.025 2479
Robust −0.052** 0.023 −2.29 −0.097 −0.008 2479
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km. Covariates include
latitude, longitude and city dummy.
63
Table B.13: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political
outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km





Conventional −0.068*** 0.011 −6.01 −0.090 −0.046 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.044*** 0.011 −3.90 −0.066 −0.022 2479
Robust −0.044*** 0.017 −2.68 −0.077 −0.012 2479
Polska Jest
Najważniejsza
Conventional −0.006** 0.003 −2.02 −0.012 0.000 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.009*** 0.003 −3.01 −0.015 −0.003 2479
Robust −0.009 0.006 −1.61 −0.020 0.002 2479
Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej
Conventional 0.015*** 0.006 2.67 0.004 0.026 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.019*** 0.006 3.47 0.008 0.030 2479
Robust 0.019*** 0.007 2.74 0.005 0.033 2479
Ruch Palikota Conventional 0.032*** 0.005 6.57 0.022 0.042 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.027*** 0.005 5.55 0.018 0.037 2479
Robust 0.027*** 0.007 4.13 0.014 0.040 2479
Polskie Stronnictwo
Ludowe
Conventional −0.046** 0.019 −2.37 −0.084 −0.008 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.037* 0.019 −1.92 −0.076 0.001 2479
Robust −0.037 0.027 −1.36 −0.091 0.016 2479
Polska Partia Pracy
– Sierpień 80
Conventional −0.004*** 0.001 −2.65 −0.007 0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.003** 0.001 −2.24 −0.006 0.000 2479
Robust −0.003 0.002 −1.49 −0.007 0.001 2479
Platforma
Obywatelska RP
Conventional 0.082*** 0.018 4.65 0.047 0.116 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.053*** 0.018 3.03 0.019 0.088 2479
Robust 0.053** 0.026 2.04 0.002 0.105 2479
Nasz Dom Polska Conventional −0.003*** 0.001 −3.46 −0.004 −0.001 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.002*** 0.001 −2.83 −0.004 0.000 2479
Robust −0.002* 0.001 −1.96 −0.005 0.000 2479
Prawica Conventional 0.002 0.001 4.05 0.001 0.003 2479
Bias-Corrected 0.001 0.001 1.00 −0.001 0.002 2479
Robust 0.001 0.001 0.68 −0.001 0.002 2479
Nowa Prawica Conventional −0.004*** 0.001 −4.73 −0.006 −0.002 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.004*** 0.001 −4.67 −0.006 −0.002 2479
Robust −0.004*** 0.002 −2.98 −0.006 −0.001 2479
Turnout Conventional −0.017 0.014 −1.21 −0.043 0.010 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.045*** 0.014 −3.27 −0.072 −0.018 2479
Robust −0.045** 0.019 −2.39 −0.082 −0.008 2479
Conservative Share Conventional −0.066*** 0.011 −5.79 −0.088 −0.044 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.044*** 0.011 −3.84 −0.066 −0.021 2479
Robust −0.044*** 0.017 −2.63 −0.076 −0.011 2479
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional −0.006 0.017 0.34 −0.028 0.039 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.003 0.017 −0.20 −0.037 0.030 2479
Robust −0.003 0.024 −0.14 −0.050 0.043 2479
Nationalist Share Conventional −0.068*** 0.011 −6.01 −0.090 −0.046 2479
Bias-Corrected −0.044*** 0.011 −3.90 −0.066 −0.022 2479
Robust −0.044*** 0.016 −2.68 −0.077 0.012 2479
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates
include latitude, longitude and city dummy.
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Table B.14: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in
Lithuania vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km
Outcome Variable Method Coeffi-
cient
Std. Err. z 95% Confidence
Interval
N
Agriculture Conventional −0.133*** 0.013 −10.13 −0.159 −0.107 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.159*** 0.013 −12.09 −0.185 −0.133 29963
Robust −0.159*** 0.019 −8.46 −0.196 −0.122 29963
Manufacturing Conventional 0.198*** 0.031 6.40 0.137 0.258 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.984*** 0.031 −31.88 −1.045 −0.924 29963
Robust −0.984*** 0.049 −19.94 −1.081 −0.888 29963
Construction Conventional 0.043 0.026 1.62 −0.009 0.094 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.086*** 0.026 −41.34 −1.137 −1.034 29963
Robust −1.086*** 0.045 −23.91 −1.175 −0.997 29963
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Conventional −1.389*** 0.069 −20.07 −1.524 −1.253 29963
Bias-Corrected −5.860*** 0.069 −84.70 −5.996 −5.725 29963
Robust −5.860*** 0.125 −46.82 −6.106 −5.615 29963
Information &
Communication
Conventional 0.009*** 0.007 1.20 −0.006 0.024 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.226*** 0.007 −30.33 −0.241 −0.211 29963
Robust −0.226*** 0.013 −17.20 −0.252 −0.200 29963
Financial &
Insurance Activities
Conventional −0.008*** 0.004 −1.98 −0.015 0.000 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.121*** 0.004 −31.51 −0.129 −0.114 29963
Robust −0.137*** 0.006 −21.13 −0.132 −0.110 29963
Real Estate
Activities
Conventional −0.225*** 0.017 −12.96 −0.259 −0.191 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.045*** 0.017 −60.26 −1.078 −1.011 29963
Robust −1.045*** 0.026 −39.84 −1.096 −0.993 29963
Professional &
Scientific Activities
Conventional −0.235*** 0.025 −9.27 −0.284 −0.185 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.920*** 0.025 −75.92 −1.970 −1.871 29963
Robust −1.920*** 0.042 −45.79 −2.002 −1.838 29963
Public
Administration
Conventional −0.457*** 0.021 −21.78 −0.498 −0.416 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.257*** 0.021 −59.91 −1.298 −1.216 29963
Robust −1.257*** 0.035 −35.40 −1.326 −1.187 29963
Other Services Conventional −0.332*** 0.039 −8.57 −0.408 −0.256 29963
Bias-Corrected −2.142*** 0.039 −55.32 −2.217 −2.066 29963
Robust −2.142*** 0.065 −32.79 −2.270 −2.014 29963
Number of
Employees
Conventional 11.186 8.443 1.32 −5.363 27.734 11569
Bias-Corrected −245.83*** 8.443 −29.12 −262.38 −229.28 11569
Robust −245.83*** 12.489 −19.68 −270.31 −221.35 11569
Income of
Economic Entities
Conventional 0.398** 0.181 2.20 0.044 0.752 5457
Bias-Corrected −0.222 0.181 −1.23 −0.575 −0.132 5457
Robust −0.222 0.251 −0.88 −0.713 −0.270 5457
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.
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Table B.15: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic
outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia
Outcome Variable Method Coeffi-
cient
Std. Err. z 95% Confidence
Interval
N
Agriculture Conventional −0.143*** 0.014 −10.07 −0.170 −0.115 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.155*** 0.014 −10.96 −0.183 −0.127 29963
Robust −0.155*** 0.020 −7.85 −0.194 −0.116 29963
Manufacturing Conventional −1.099*** 0.037 −29.70 −1.172 −1.027 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.674*** 0.037 −45.24 −1.747 −1.602 29963
Robust −1.674*** 0.055 −30.31 −1.783 −1.566 29963
Construction Conventional −1.251*** 0.035 −35.95 −1.319 −1.183 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.843*** 0.035 −52.95 −1.911 −1.775 29963
Robust −1.843*** 0.055 −33.33 −1.951 −1.734 29963
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Conventional −6.478*** 0.104 −62.26 −6.682 −6.274 29963
Bias-Corrected −8.723*** 0.104 −83.83 −8.926 −8.519 29963
Robust −8.723*** 0.165 −52.99 −9.045 −8.400 29963
Information &
Communication
Conventional −0.279*** 0.009 −31.65 −0.296 −0.262 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.379*** 0.009 −42.97 −0.396 −0.361 29963
Robust −0.379*** 0.014 −26.46 −0.407 −0.350 29963
Financial &
Insurance Activities
Conventional −0.115*** 0.004 −27.90 −0.123 −0.107 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.172*** 0.004 −41.73 −0.180 −0.164 29963
Robust −0.172*** 0.006 −27.46 −0.184 −0.160 29963
Real Estate
Activities
Conventional −1.142*** 0.022 −51.88 −1.185 −1.099 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.550*** 0.022 −70.40 −1.593 −1.506 29963
Robust −1.550*** 0.033 −46.49 −1.615 −1.484 29963
Professional &
Scientific Activities
Conventional −2.144*** 0.034 −62.57 −2.211 −2.077 29963
Bias-Corrected −2.946*** 0.034 −85.96 −3.013 −2.879 29963
Robust −2.946*** 0.053 −56.10 −3.049 −2.843 29963
Public
Administration
Conventional −1.230*** 0.026 −47.65 −1.280 −1.179 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.698*** 0.026 −65.80 −1.749 −1.648 29963
Robust −1.698*** 0.040 −42.91 −1.776 −1.621 29963
Other Services Conventional −2.127*** 0.048 −44.43 −2.221 −2.033 29963
Bias-Corrected −3.010*** 0.048 −62.87 −3.104 −2.916 29963
Robust −3.010*** 0.075 −40.27 −3.156 −2.863 29963
Number of
Employees
Conventional −240.29*** 10.099 −23.79 −260.08 −220.49 11569
Bias-Corrected −355.20*** 10.099 −35.17 −374.99 −335.41 11569
Robust −355.20*** 14.182 −25.05 −333.00 −327.41 11569
Income of
Economic Entities
Conventional −0.472** 0.211 −2.24 −0.885 −0.059 5457
Bias-Corrected −0.669*** 0.211 −3.18 −1.082 −0.256 5457
Robust −0.669** 0.284 −2.36 −1.225 −0.113 5457
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km. Covariates include
latitude, longitude, city distance and city dummy.
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Table B.16: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic
outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km
Outcome Variable Method Coeffi-
cient
Std. Err. z 95% Confidence
Interval
N
Agriculture Conventional −0.137*** 0.013 −10.42 −0.163 −0.111 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.158*** 0.013 −11.99 −0.184 −0.132 29963
Robust −0.158*** 0.019 −8.39 −0.195 −0.121 29963
Manufacturing Conventional −1.022*** 0.036 −28.67 −1.092 −0.952 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.802*** 0.036 −50.53 −1.872 −1.732 29963
Robust −1.802*** 0.054 −33.30 −1.908 −1.696 29963
Construction Conventional −1.120*** 0.032 −35.10 −1.182 −1.057 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.879*** 0.032 −58.91 −1.941 −1.816 29963
Robust −1.879*** 0.051 −36.80 −1.979 −1.779 29963
Wholesale & Retail
Trade
Conventional −6.206*** 0.097 −63.91 −6.397 −6.016 29963
Bias-Corrected −9.108*** 0.097 −93.79 −9.298 −8.918 29963
Robust −9.108*** 0.152 −59.91 −9.406 −8.810 29963
Information &
Communication
Conventional −0.355*** 0.009 −37.90 −0.374 −0.337 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.471*** 0.009 −50.26 −0.490 −0.453 29963
Robust −0.471*** 0.015 −31.39 −0.501 −0.442 29963
Financial &
Insurance Activities
Conventional −0.110*** 0.004 −26.47 −0.118 −0.102 29963
Bias-Corrected −0.189*** 0.004 −45.58 −0.197 −0.181 29963
Robust −0.189*** 0.006 −31.25 −0.201 −0.177 29963
Real Estate
Activities
Conventional −1.039*** 0.021 −49.77 −1.080 −0.998 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.599*** 0.021 −76.58 −1.640 −1.558 29963
Robust −1.599*** 0.030 −53.71 −1.657 −1.541 29963
Professional &
Scientific Activities
Conventional −2.070*** 0.036 −57.43 −2.140 −1.999 29963
Bias-Corrected −3.160*** 0.036 −87.67 −3.230 −3.089 29963
Robust −3.160*** 0.053 −59.52 −3.264 −3.055 29963
Public
Administration
Conventional −1.221*** 0.024 −50.25 −1.269 −1.173 29963
Bias-Corrected −1.768*** 0.024 −72.75 −1.815 −1.720 29963
Robust −1.768*** 0.039 −45.59 −1.843 −1.691 29963
Other Services Conventional −1.976*** 0.046 −42.97 −2.066 −1.886 29963
Bias-Corrected −3.262*** 0.046 −70.93 −3.352 −3.172 29963
Robust −3.262*** 0.072 −45.03 −3.404 −3.120 29963
Number of
Employees
Conventional −223.70*** 9.817 −22.79 −242.94 −204.46 11569
Bias-Corrected −396.55*** 9.817 −40.40 −415.79 −377.31 11569
Robust −396.55*** 14.119 −28.09 −424.22 −368.88 11569
Income of
Economic Entities
Conventional −0.402** 0.190 −2.12 −0.773 −0.030 5457
Bias-Corrected −0.703*** 0.190 −3.71 −1.074 −0.331 5457
Robust −0.703*** 0.267 −2.64 −1.225 −0.180 5457
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates
include latitude, longitude, city distance and city dummy.
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Table B.17: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania
vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km





Labor Party Conventional 0.057** 0.025 2.33 0.009 0.106 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.057** 0.025 2.31 0.009 0.105 2000
Robust 0.057* 0.033 1.74 −0.007 0.121 2000
Social Democratic
Party
Conventional −0.118*** 0.023 −5.21 −0.162 −0.074 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.081*** 0.023 −3.57 −0.125 −0.036 2000
Robust −0.081*** 0.029 −2.76 −0.138 −0.023 2000
Homeland Union Conventional −0.020** 0.010 −2.02 −0.039 −0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.029*** 0.010 −2.90 −0.048 −0.009 2000
Robust −0.029** 0.013 −2.25 −0.054 −0.004 2000
Liberals Movement Conventional 0.013 0.013 0.95 −0.013 0.038 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.026** 0.013 −1.98 −0.052 0.000 2000
Robust −0.026 0.016 −1.58 −0.058 0.006 2000
The Way of
Courage
Conventional 0.000 0.007 −0.03 −0.014 0.013 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.012*** 0.007 −1.69 −0.025 0.002 2000
Robust −0.012 0.009 −1.25 −0.030 0.007 2000
Order & Justice Conventional 0.087** 0.037 2.38 0.015 0.159 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.120*** 0.037 3.28 0.048 0.192 2000
Robust 0.120*** 0.044 2.70 0.033 0.207 2000
Poles’ Electoral
Action
Conventional 0.002* 0.001 1.74 −0.001 0.005 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.028*** 0.001 −19.43 −0.031 −0.024 2000
Robust −0.028*** 0.003 −10.94 −0.033 −0.023 2000
Peasant & Greens
Union
Conventional −0.008 0.012 −0.71 −0.031 0.014 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.008 0.012 0.71 −0.014 0.031 2000
Robust 0.008 0.015 0.53 −0.022 0.038 2000
Liberal & Centre
Union
Conventional −0.008* 0.005 −1.71 −0.017 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.006 0.005 −1.37 −0.015 0.003 2000
Robust −0.006 0.006 −1.13 −0.017 0.005 2000
Union YES Conventional 0.008 0.005 1.74 −0.001 0.017 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.011*** 0.005 2.35 0.002 0.019 2000
Robust 0.011** 0.006 1.71 −0.002 0.023 2000
Socialist People’s
Front
Conventional −0.003*** 0.001 −3.04 −0.005 −0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.007*** 0.001 −6.32 −0.009 −0.005 2000
Robust −0.007*** 0.002 −4.48 −0.010 −0.004 2000
Christian Party Conventional −0.007*** 0.003 −2.81 −0.012 −0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.004* 0.003 −1.74 −0.009 0.001 2000
Robust −0.004 0.003 −1.30 −0.011 0.002 2000
National
Association
Conventional −0.002 0.002 −1.07 −0.005 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.004** 0.002 −2.38 −0.007 −0.001 2000
Robust −0.004* 0.002 −1.71 −0.009 0.001 2000
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Table B.17 – continued





Young Lithuania Conventional 0.0003 0.001 0.38 −0.002 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.0004 0.001 0.45 −0.001 0.002 2000
Robust 0.0004 0.001 0.36 −0.002 0.003 2000
Democratic Labor
& Unity Party
Conventional −0.001 0.001 −1.38 −0.003 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.0002 0.001 −0.16 −0.002 0.002 2000
Robust 0.0002 0.001 −0.14 −0.003 0.002 2000
Emigrants’ Party Conventional 0.000 0.001 −0.17 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.001 0.001 −1.34 −0.002 0.000 2000
Robust −0.001 0.001 −1.07 −0.002 0.001 2000
Republican Party Conventional 0.000 0.001 −0.07 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.000 0.001 −0.05 −0.001 0.001 2000
Robust 0.000 0.001 −0.04 −0.002 0.001 2000
People’s Party Conventional 0.000 0.001 0.24 −0.001 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.001 0.001 1.22 −0.001 0.002 2000
Robust 0.001 0.001 1.12 −0.001 0.002 2000
Turnout Conventional −0.013 0.018 −0.71 −0.049 0.023 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.003 0.018 −0.15 −0.039 0.033 2000
Robust −0.003 0.024 −0.11 −0.049 0.043 2000
Conservative Share Conventional 0.074** 0.036 2.05 0.003 0.146 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.097*** 0.036 2.66 0.025 0.168 2000
Robust 0.097** 0.042 2.29 0.014 0.179 2000
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional 0.059* 0.028 2.10 0.004 0.114 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.036 0.028 1.26 −0.020 0.091 2000
Robust 0.036 0.035 1.00 −0.034 0.105 2000
Nationalist Share Conventional 0.065** 0.033 1.99 0.001 0.130 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.089*** 0.033 2.67 0.023 0.152 2000
Robust 0.089** 0.041 2.13 0.007 0.169 2000
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.
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Table B.18: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political
outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia





Labor Party Conventional 0.068** 0.026 2.59 0.017 0.119 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.068** 0.026 2.59 0.016 0.119 2000
Robust 0.068** 0.034 2.00 0.001 0.134 2000
Social Democratic
Party
Conventional −0.085*** 0.021 −3.99 −0.126 −0.043 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.069*** 0.021 −3.25 −0.111 −0.027 2000
Robust −0.069*** 0.026 −2.66 −0.120 −0.018 2000
Homeland Union Conventional −0.039*** 0.010 −3.70 −0.059 −0.018 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.034*** 0.010 −3.23 −0.054 −0.013 2000
Robust −0.034** 0.014 −2.48 −0.060 −0.007 2000
Liberals Movement Conventional −0.016 0.011 −1.39 −0.037 0.006 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.014 0.011 −1.30 −0.036 0.007 2000
Robust −0.014 0.014 −1.00 −0.043 0.014 2000
The Way of
Courage
Conventional −0.014** 0.007 −2.01 −0.028 0.000 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.018** 0.007 −2.58 −0.031 −0.004 2000
Robust −0.018** 0.009 −1.98 −0.036 0.000 2000
Order & Justice Conventional −0.099*** 0.037 2.64 0.025 0.173 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.083** 0.037 2.20 0.009 0.157 2000
Robust −0.083* 0.044 1.87 −0.004 0.170 2000
Poles’ Electoral
Action
Conventional −0.007** 0.003 −2.20 −0.014 −0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.016*** 0.003 −4.65 −0.022 −0.009 2000
Robust −0.016*** 0.004 −3.73 −0.024 −0.024 2000
Peasant & Greens
Union
Conventional 0.008 0.012 0.66 −0.016 0.032 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.011 0.012 0.90 −0.013 0.035 2000
Robust 0.011 0.016 0.69 −0.020 0.042 2000
Liberal & Centre
Union
Conventional −0.007 0.005 −1.34 −0.017 0.003 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.006 0.005 −1.14 −0.016 0.004 2000
Robust −0.006 0.006 −0.96 −0.018 0.006 2000
Union YES Conventional 0.007 0.005 1.46 −0.002 0.016 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.008* 0.005 1.75 −0.001 0.017 2000
Robust 0.008 0.006 1.29 −0.004 0.021 2000
Socialist People’s
Front
Conventional −0.004*** 0.001 −3.74 −0.007 −0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.005*** 0.001 −4.58 −0.008 −0.003 2000
Robust −0.005*** 0.002 −3.48 −0.009 −0.002 2000
Christian Party Conventional −0.008*** 0.003 −2.91 −0.013 −0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.006** 0.003 −2.22 −0.011 −0.001 2000
Robust −0.006* 0.003 −1.74 −0.012 0.001 2000
National
Association
Conventional −0.003 0.002 −1.47 −0.006 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.003 0.002 −1.54 −0.006 0.001 2000
Robust −0.003 0.002 −1.17 −0.007 0.002 2000
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Table B.18 – continued





Young Lithuania Conventional 0.0001 0.001 0.06 −0.002 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.001 0.001 0.50 −0.001 0.003 2000
Robust 0.001 0.001 0.40 −0.002 0.003 2000
Democratic Labor
& Unity Party
Conventional −0.0004 0.001 −0.41 −0.003 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.0003 0.001 0.31 −0.002 0.002 2000
Robust 0.0003 0.001 0.28 −0.002 0.003 2000
Emigrants’ Party Conventional 0.000 0.001 −0.69 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.001 0.001 −1.42 −0.002 0.000 2000
Robust −0.001 0.001 −1.22 −0.002 0.001 2000
Republican Party Conventional −0.0001 0.001 −0.20 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.0001 0.001 −0.19 −0.001 0.001 2000
Robust −0.0001 0.001 −0.15 −0.002 0.001 2000
People’s Party Conventional 0.0002 0.001 0.39 −0.001 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.001 0.001 1.11 −0.001 0.002 2000
Robust 0.001 0.001 0.93 −0.001 0.002 2000
Turnout Conventional −0.006 0.020 −0.33 −0.045 0.032 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.012 0.020 −0.60 −0.050 0.027 2000
Robust −0.012 0.025 −0.48 −0.060 0.036 2000
Conservative Share Conventional 0.093** 0.036 2.55 0.021 0.164 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.073** 0.036 2.01 0.002 0.144 2000
Robust 0.073* 0.042 1.74 −0.009 0.155 2000
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional 0.032 0.029 1.10 −0.025 0.088 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.019 0.029 0.66 −0.038 0.076 2000
Robust 0.019 0.034 0.57 −0.047 0.085 2000
Nationalist Share Conventional 0.058* 0.035 1.65 −0.011 0.128 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.047 0.035 1.33 −0.022 0.116 2000
Robust 0.047 0.042 1.11 −0.036 0.130 2000
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km. Covariates include
latitude, longitude, city distance and city dummy.
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Table B.19: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political
outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km





Labor Party Conventional 0.079** 0.025 3.20 0.031 0.127 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.053** 0.025 2.14 0.004 0.101 2000
Robust 0.053 0.033 1.59 −0.012 0.117 2000
Social Democratic
Party
Conventional −0.078*** 0.021 −3.67 −0.120 −0.036 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.076*** 0.021 −3.56 −0.118 −0.034 2000
Robust −0.076*** 0.025 −2.99 −0.126 −0.026 2000
Homeland Union Conventional −0.047*** 0.010 −4.60 −0.068 −0.027 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.030*** 0.010 −2.92 −0.050 −0.010 2000
Robust −0.030** 0.014 −2.11 −0.058 −0.002 2000
Liberals Movement Conventional −0.014 0.011 −1.24 −0.035 0.008 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.023** 0.011 −2.09 −0.044 −0.001 2000
Robust −0.023 0.014 −1.61 −0.051 0.005 2000
The Way of
Courage
Conventional −0.017** 0.007 −2.34 −0.030 −0.003 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.005 0.007 −0.77 −0.019 0.008 2000
Robust −0.005 0.009 −0.58 −0.024 0.013 2000
Order & Justice Conventional −0.091** 0.037 2.48 0.019 0.163 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.105*** 0.037 2.85 0.033 0.177 2000
Robust −0.105** 0.044 2.38 0.019 0.191 2000
Poles’ Electoral
Action
Conventional −0.004** 0.002 −1.99 −0.007 0.000 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.025*** 0.002 −14.26 −0.029 −0.022 2000
Robust −0.025*** 0.003 −8.90 −0.031 −0.020 2000
Peasant & Greens
Union
Conventional 0.008 0.012 0.68 −0.015 0.030 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.011 0.012 0.93 −0.012 0.033 2000
Robust 0.011 0.016 0.68 −0.020 0.042 2000
Liberal & Centre
Union
Conventional −0.007 0.005 −1.49 −0.016 0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.006 0.005 −1.21 −0.015 0.003 2000
Robust −0.006 0.006 −0.99 −0.017 0.006 2000
Union YES Conventional 0.007 0.005 1.42 −0.002 0.015 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.011** 0.005 2.46 0.002 0.020 2000
Robust 0.011* 0.006 1.80 −0.001 0.023 2000
Socialist People’s
Front
Conventional −0.004*** 0.001 −3.61 −0.006 −0.002 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.007*** 0.001 −6.18 −0.009 −0.005 2000
Robust −0.007*** 0.002 −4.40 −0.010 −0.004 2000
Christian Party Conventional −0.010*** 0.002 −4.05 −0.015 −0.005 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.006** 0.002 −2.31 −0.010 −0.001 2000
Robust −0.006* 0.003 −1.74 −0.012 0.001 2000
National
Association
Conventional −0.002 0.002 −1.33 −0.005 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.004* 0.002 −2.15 −0.007 0.000 2000
Robust −0.004 0.002 −1.55 −0.008 0.001 2000
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Table B.19 – continued





Young Lithuania Conventional −0.001 0.001 −0.65 −0.003 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.001 0.001 1.31 −0.001 0.003 2000
Robust 0.001 0.001 1.03 −0.001 0.004 2000
Democratic Labor
& Unity Party
Conventional −0.001 0.001 −0.89 −0.003 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.0002 0.001 −0.18 −0.002 0.002 2000
Robust −0.0002 0.001 −0.15 −0.003 0.002 2000
Emigrants’ Party Conventional −0.0004 0.001 −0.91 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected −0.001 0.001 −1.06 −0.002 0.001 2000
Robust −0.001 0.001 −0.85 −0.002 0.000 2000
Republican Party Conventional 0.0000 0.001 −0.06 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.0001 0.001 0.11 −0.001 0.001 2000
Robust 0.0001 0.001 0.08 −0.001 0.002 2000
People’s Party Conventional 0.000 0.001 −0.03 −0.001 0.001 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.001* 0.001 1.67 0.000 0.003 2000
Robust 0.001 0.001 1.56 0.000 0.003 2000
Turnout Conventional −0.010 0.019 −0.53 −0.047 0.027 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.003 0.019 0.13 −0.035 0.040 2000
Robust 0.003 0.024 0.11 −0.045 0.050 2000
Conservative Share Conventional 0.085** 0.036 2.33 0.014 0.156 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.086** 0.036 2.36 0.014 0.157 2000
Robust 0.086** 0.042 2.05 0.004 0.168 2000
Liberal-Conservative
Share
Conventional 0.017 0.028 0.60 −0.039 0.073 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.027 0.028 0.96 −0.028 0.083 2000
Robust 0.027 0.034 0.81 −0.039 0.093 2000
Nationalist Share Conventional 0.041 0.035 1.18 −0.027 0.109 2000
Bias-Corrected 0.072** 0.035 2.09 0.005 0.140 2000
Robust 0.072* 0.042 1.72 −0.010 0.155 2000
Notes: ***, **, * - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates
include latitude, longitude, city distance and city dummy.
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Table B.20: Estimation results for the similarities with East Prussia, Lithuania and
Poland – Bandwidth of 60 km & 100 km
Bandwidth 60 km 60 km 60 km 100 km 100 km 100 km
Dep. variable turnout cons. national. turnout cons. national.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LT 0.089*** −0.209*** −0.136*** 0.088*** −0.260*** −0.141***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.020) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018)
LTEP −0.017 0.128*** 0.091*** −0.024** 0.111*** 0.033**
(0.012) (0.023) (0.021) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015)
PLEP −0.035*** −0.089*** −0.099*** −0.034*** −0.143*** −0.135***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
City 0.011 −0.094*** −0.062*** 0.038*** −0.086*** 0.009
(0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)Dist. to EP border
(tkm) 0.604*** 0.396** −0.022 0.475*** −0.390* −0.555***
(0.143) (0.193) (0.204) (0.061) (0.104) (0.097)Dist. to EP border
(EP) (tkm) 0.458 −1.673*** −1.388*** −0.219 −0.503*** −0.386
(0.420) (0.438) (0.397) (0.317) (0.277) (0.260)
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 894 894 894 1611 1611 1611
R-squared 0.406 0.280 0.150 0.369 0.358 0.180
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lithuania vs. Poland
in EP
0.106*** 0.008 0.054** 0.099*** −0.006 0.027
Δ LT vs. PL in EP /
outside EP
0.018 −0.201*** −0.082*** 0.011 −0.254*** −0.114***



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.1: Turnout in parliament elections in Lithuania (2012), Poland and Russia
(2011): East Prussia and neighboring regions
Source: Authors’ work. Base map: GADM & ESRI Gray, election data: see Table A.1
80
Figure C.2: Share of votes for nationalistic parties in parliament elections in Lithuania
(2012), Poland and Russia (2011): East Prussia and neighboring regions
Source: Authors’ work. Base map: GADM & ESRI Gray, election data: see Table A.1
Figure C.3: Share of votes for NSDAP in Germany, 1933
Source: Authors’ work. Base map: MPIDR and CGG 2011b, election data: see Table
A.1
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Figure C.4: Share of votes for nationalistic parties in parliament elections in the FRG,
1949
Source: Authors’ work. Base map: MPIDR and CGG 2011a, election data: see Table
A.1
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Figure C.5: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs.
East Prussia (all parties)
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Figure C.5: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs.
East Prussia (all parties) – continued
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Figure C.6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania
vs. East Prussia (all parties)
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Figure C.6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania
vs. East Prussia (all parties) – continued
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Figure C.6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania
vs. East Prussia (all parties) – continued
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Figure C.7: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in
Poland vs. East Prussia
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Figure C.7: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in
Poland vs. East Prussia – continued
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Figure C.8: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in
Lithuania vs. East Prussia
90
Figure C.8: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in
Lithuania vs. East Prussia – continued
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Figure C.9: CEM weights vs. strata (economic outcomes)
(a) Match I (b) Match II
Figure C.10: Post-CEM regressions (economic outcomes)
(a) Match I (b) Match II
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